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Rescue the Americans With Disabilities Act
from Restrictive Interpretations:
Alcoholism as an Illustration
JUDITH J. JOHNSON*

We alcoholics are men and women who have lost the ability to control our
drinking. We know that no real alcoholic ever recovers control. All of us
felt at times that we were regaining control, but such intervals - usually
brief - were inevitably followed by still less control, which led in time to
pitiful and incomprehensible demoralization. We are convinced to a man
that alcoholics of our type are in the grip of a progressive illness. Over any
considerable period we get worse, never better. We are like men who have
lost their legs; they never grow new ones.
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INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court has narrowed the doorway into the protected class
for the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) 2 in virtually every
employment case. 3 Taking their cue from the Supreme Court, the lower
courts have been concerned principally with who is "disabled" and thus
protected by the ADA. 4 The answer today is not many people.5 The courts
2.
42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000). The ADA was directed at a broad spectrum
of discrimination against people with disabilities, not just in employment, but in public
services, accommodations and telecommunications. JOEL WM. FRIEDMAN & GEORGE M.
STRICKLER, JR., THE LAW OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 793 (5th ed. 2001).

3.
See infra Section IV.B. 1; see also Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Supreme Court,
The Americans with Disabilities Act, and Rational Discrimination,55 ALA. L. REv. 923
(2004). [hereinafter, Bagenstos, Supreme Court].
4.
See infra Section IV.B.2.
5.
See Eliza Kaiser, The Americans with DisabilitiesAct: An Unfulfilled Promise
for Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 735, 736 (2004)
("Employers prevail in over ninety percent of ADA Title I cases ... In construing and
applying Title I of the ADA, courts have defied congressional intent and limited the scope of
the ADA to a very narrow class of plaintiffs."); see also Ruth Colker, Winning and Losing
Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 239, 240 (2001) [hereinafter
Colker, Winning]; Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for
Defendants, 34 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 99, 161 (1999) [hereinafter Colker, Windfall]. See
Sarah Shaw, Why Courts Cannot Deny ADA Protection to Plaintiffs Who Do Not Use
Available Mitigating Measures for Their Impairments, 90 CAL. L. REv. 1981, 1984 n.2
(2002), for a collection of law reviews that discuss this issue.
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generally have been so hostile to ADA plaintiffs that it is difficult now to
find a case in which the plaintiff was able to prove that he was disabled.6
Congress contemplated that some impairments would always be disabling. 7 The Supreme Court, however, has so narrowly construed the term
"significantly limited in a major life activity," which defines the protected
class, that many impairments formerly considered to be inevitably
disabling, such as alcoholism, are no longer protected by the ADA.8
Congress referred to alcoholism many times in the legislative history, 9 and
6.
See infra Section IV.B.2.; see also infra note 312; see also Colker, Windfall,
supra note 5, at 100 ("[D]efendants prevail in more than ninety-three percent of reported
ADA employment discrimination cases decided on the merits at the trial court level. Of
those cases that are appealed, defendants prevail in eighty-four percent of reported cases.").
7.
See Susan Stefan, Delusions of Rights: Americans with PsychiatricDisabilities,
Employment Discriminationand the Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 52 ALA. L. REv. 271,
302 (2000).
8. See infra note 312.
9.
There were many references to alcoholism in the legislative history. After much
debate, it is clear that Congress intended to protect alcoholics, especially those in recovery.
See, e.g., U.S. Comm. on Education and Lbor, H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, at 689 (2d Sess.
1990):
[T]he issue of whether to include drug addicts and alcoholics within the
definition of handicapped person was of major concern to many commenters ....While some comments reflected misconceptions about the
implications of including alcoholics and drug addicts within the scope of
the regulation, the Secretary understands the concerns that underlie the
comments on the question and recognizes the application of section 504
to active alcoholics and drug addicts present sensitive and difficult questions that must be taken into account in interpretation and enforcement.
The Secretary has carefully examined the issue and has obtained a legal opinion from the Attorney General. That opinion concludes that
drug addiction and alcoholism are "physical or mental impairments"
within meaning of section 7(6) of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as
amended, and the drug addicts and alcoholics are therefore handicapped
for purposes of section 504 if their impairment substantially limits one
of their major life activities. The Secretary therefore believes that he is
without authority to exclude those conditions from the definition. There
is a medical and legal consensus that alcoholism and drug addiction are
diseases, although there is disagreement as to whether they are primarily
mental or physical. In addition, while enacting section 504, the committees that considered the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 were made aware of
the Department's long-standing practice of treating addicts and alcoholics as handicapped individuals eligible for rehabilitation services under
the Vocational Rehabilitation Act.
Id. at 59 ("It is not possible to include in the legislation a list of all the specific conditions,
diseases, or infections that would constitute physical or mental impairments ....The term
includes, however, such conditions, diseases, and infections as: ...drug addiction, and
alcoholism.); S. REP. No. 101-116, at 106 (1989) ("[lIt is intended that rehabilitated
alcoholics and drug users will be protected under this law."); Americans with Disabilities
Act: Hearing before the H. Comm. on Small Business, 101st Cong. 63 (1990) (statement of
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included a specific reference to alcoholism in the statute.' 0 For this reason,
and because alcoholics tend to be discriminated against because they are
not perceived to have a "real illness,"" I have chosen alcoholism to
illustrate the extreme difficulty of proving a disability under the current
case law.
The ADA was enacted to "provide a clear and comprehensive national
mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with
Rep. Tom Delay, Member, House Comm. on Small Business) ("The intent of the ADA is to
protect the disabled. The bill now covers more than 900 unknown (sic) disabilities. This
broad application includes drug addicts, alcoholics, people with contagious diseases and
individuals with "voluntary" conditions such as being overweight.");
It is important to emphasize that we continue to protect applicants and
employees who have overcome or are successfully being treated for drug
or alcohol problems. Retaining these crucial protections for persons
who have recovered or are in treatment is consistent with our national
drug strategy and our longstanding commitment to supporting the treatment of those with drug and alcohol problems and working to ensure the
full reintegration of former drug and alcohol abusers into the working
world.
135 CONG. REC. S10800-10801 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989) (statement of Sen. Simon); 136
CONG. REC. H2316 (daily ed. May 15, 1990) (statement of Rep. Delay) ("Those that are
former drug addicts and alcoholics, even though they may be reformed, cannot be
discriminated against. They are considered as disabled.");
The bill excludes from protection individuals who are current drug users
and it removes protections for current drug users under the Rehabilitation Act. However, the bill explicitly retains protections for recovered
persons, individuals who have successfully completed treatment, and
persons currently in drug or alcohol treatment, who are not using drugs
illegally. The bill also protects persons who are erroneously regarded as
current illegal users of drugs ....
This bill strikes a delicate balance. It recognizes the need to protect employers, workers, and the public from persons whose current illegal drug
use impairs their ability to perform a job and whose employment could
result in serious harm to the lives or property of others. At the same
time, the bill recognizes that treatment for those in the grips of substance
abuse is not only the compassionate thing to do but an essential component of a comprehensive attack on drugs. Treatment can save the lives
of individual abusers, and it can also return them to productive roles in
society, which strengthens our families, our communities, our economy,
and our ability to meet the competitive challenges of the growing international marketplace. By providing protections against discrimination
for recovered substance abusers and those in treatment or recovery who
are no longer engaged in illegal drug use, the bill provides an incentive
for treatment.
136 CONG. REC. H2443 (daily ed. May 17, 1990) (statement of Rep. Rangel).
10.
42 U.S.C. § 12114 (2000).
11.
See Jerome H. Jaffe & Roger E. Meyer, Disease Concept of Alcoholism and
DrugAbuse, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF DRUGS, ALCOHOL & ADDICTIVE BEHAVIOR 398 (Rosalyn
Carson-DeWitt et al. eds., 2d ed. 2001).
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disabilities[.]"' 12 Today that mandate is not being fulfilled, especially in the
employment area.13 The ADA was modeled on the Rehabilitation Act of
1973 (the Rehabilitation Act). 14 Although the ADA specifically provides
that it should not be construed to apply a lesser standard than that applied
under the Rehabilitation Act, 15 employees who sought protection under that
Act before the ADA was adopted did not have the problems proving that
they were disabled that employees are having today under the ADA. 16 In
almost every case involving Title I, the part of the ADA that applies to
employment, the Supreme Court has interpreted the ADA so restrictively
that to qualify for its protections one would have to be so impaired that he
would generally be unable to work at all. 17 However, when the Court has
dealt with non-employment cases, it has been much more generous. 18
The ADA prohibits discrimination against a qualified person with
disabilities. 19 To be classified as disabled, a person must 1) have an
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities; or 2)
have a record of such an impairment; or 3) be regarded as having such an
impairment. 20 Major life activities include such things as seeing, hearing,
and taking care of oneself.21 In addition to proving a disability, under Title
I, the person must be "qualified," which means that he must be able to

12.
42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (2000).
13.
Employment rates for impaired people have actually declined since the ADA
was enacted. See Michael Waterstone, The Untold Story of the Rest of the Americans with
DisabilitiesAct, 58 VAND. L. REv. 1807, 1812-13 (2005).
14.
29 U.S.C. §§ 705(2), 791, 793, 794 (2000).
15.
42 U.S.C. § 12201(a) (2000). The Rehabilitation Act still applies, but its
standards are the ADA. See Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., "SubstantiallyLimited" Protection
from Disability Discrimination: The Special Treatment Model and Misconstructions of the
Definition of Disability, 42 VILL. L. REv. 409, 428-30 (1997), for a discussion of the
provisions of the Rehabilitation Act.
16.
See Stefan, supra note 7, at 301 ("Defendants in Section 504 [of the Rehabilitation Act] cases rarely contested the issue of whether a plaintiff was handicapped under the
Act [footnote omitted] .... Plaintiffs were found to be disabled under the Rehabilitation Act
with conditions nearly identical to those presently being found by courts to not constitute
disabilities under the ADA .... ); see also Colker, Windfall, supra note 5, at 160; Kaiser,
supra note 5, at 742.
17.
See infra Section III.B.
18.
See, e.g., Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998); PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin,
532 U.S. 661 (2001). See Waterstone, supra note 13, at 1838-42, for a discussion of nonemployment cases in which the plaintiff was treated more favorably than in employment
cases.
19.
42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6) (2000).
20.
42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000).
21.
See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 638-39 (citing 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii) (1997); 28
C.F.R. § 41.3 1(b)(2) (1997)).
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perform essential job duties of the position with or without reasonable
accommodation. 22
At first blush, it would seem that the ADA itself set up a "catch-22"
for employees to qualify for the protected class by requiring that they be
substantially limited in a major life activity, yet still able to perform the
essential duties of the job.2 3 However, it is the courts that have recently
created the dilemma by requiring an employee to be so substantially limited
in a major life activity that he will generally be precluded from being able
to perform the job.2 4 The class of disabled people today is virtually limited
to people who are completely blind, deaf, or in a wheelchair because, in
essence, they are totally limited in a major life activity.25 Many of them
cannot work at all. People with less obvious impairments, such as
alcoholism, diabetes, back injuries, and mental illness, who can work,
usually are not determined to be sufficiently limited in a major life activity
under the Court's narrow interpretations.26
Because Congress spent
considerable time discussing protecting persons with such impairments, it is
clear that the ADA was not intended to be restricted to impairments that are
totally limiting.27 Congress was particularly concerned about "stereotypic
assumptions" that created myths and fears about disabled people.28
Alcoholism is a disability about which stereotypic assumptions are
particularly problematic. Alcoholics in particular suffer from the "systematic prejudice, stereotypes, and neglect" that were the central concerns of
the ADA.29 They are more likely to be discriminated against because they
22.
42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2000) (defining "qualified individual with a disability");
see also 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2000). Under the ADA, the employer must provide the
reasonable accommodation unless to do so would be an undue hardship. 42 U.S.C. §

12112(b)(5)(A) (2000).
23. See Burgdorf, supranote 15, at 425-26.
24. See infra Section III.B.
25. See Kaiser, supra note 5, at 736; infra discussion accompanying note 312.
26. See infra Section IV.B and note 312.
27. See Cheryl L. Anderson, "Deserving Disabilities": Why the Definition of
Disability Under the Americans with Disabilities Act Should be Revised to Eliminate the
SubstantialLimitation Requirement, 65 Mo. L. REV. 83, 95 (2000).

28. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (2000); see also Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination,
Stigma, and "Disability," 86 VA. L. REv. 397, 445-48 (2000) [hereinafter Bagenstos,
Subordination]. "The statutory 'disability' category should embrace those actual, past, and
perceived impairments that subject people to systematic disadvantages in society. And the
concept of stigma should play an important evidentiary role." Id.
at 445. The author
suggests that impairments such as HIV and epilepsy should always be considered disabilities
because of their stigmatizing effect, and that the agencies that administer the Act should be
able to identify such impairments. Id. at 527.
29. See Bagenstos, Subordination, supra note 28, at 426. Even physicians have
negative views about alcoholics. Physicians often see alcoholism as a problem of willpower
or conduct because of the lack of attention paid to the disease in medical schools. See
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are often not perceived to be suffering from a "real" illness. 30 Alcoholics
have also historically been subjected to ridicule and contempt:
Throughout most of recorded history, excessive use of
ALCOHOL was viewed as a willful act leading to intoxication and other sinful behaviors. The Bible warns against
drunkenness; Islam bans alcohol use entirely. Since the
early nineteenth century, the moral perspective has competed with a conceptualization of excessive use of alcohol
as a disease or disorder, not necessarily a moral failing. 3'
Congress obviously assumed that alcoholics would be protected by the
ADA because the Act provides that an alcoholic must be able to comply
with all employment requirements.3 2 Nevertheless, under current case law,
it is difficult to imagine how an alcoholic could be determined to be
disabled and yet still be employable. If an alcoholic is in recovery his
impairment is not significantly affecting any major life activity under the
Court's strict interpretations of those terms.33 Surely the ADA did not
intend that recovering addicts and alcoholics, as well as other people with
impairments who are striving to overcome their limitations, such as

Thomas R. Hobbs, Managing Alcoholism as a Disease, PHYSICIAN'S NEWS DIGEST, Feb.

1998, available at http://physiciansnews.com/commentary/298wp.html.
30.
See Jaffe & Meyer, supra note 11; see, e.g., Evans v. Federal Express Corp.,
133 F.3d 137, 141 (1st Cir. 1998) (holding that alcoholism was a less "sympathetic" case
than cluster migraines).
31.
Jaffe & Meyer, supra note 11, at 398.
32.
42 U.S.C. § 12114(c) (2000) provides in part as follows:
(c) Authority of covered entity
A covered entity(1) may prohibit the illegal use of drugs and the use of alcohol at the
workplace by all employees;
(2) may require that employees shall not be under the influence of alcohol or be engaging in the illegal use of drugs at the workplace;
(3) may require that employees behave in conformance with the requirements established under the Drug-Free Workplace Act of 1988 (41
U.S.C. 701 et seq.);
(4) may hold an employee who engages in the illegal use of drugs or
who is an alcoholic to the same qualification standards for employment
or job performance and behavior that such entity holds other employees,
even if any unsatisfactory performance or behavior is related to the drug
use or alcoholism of such employee ....
Id.
33.
See infra Section IV.B.2.a. 1). Even if an alcoholic is in active addiction, courts
more often than not find that even then there is no significant impairment of a major life
activity. Id.
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diabetics, 34 should not receive the benefit of reasonable accommodations
that would allow them to work.3 5 With regard to alcoholism, as with most
other impairments today, if the plaintiff is able to prove that he is disabled,
he generally would be so impaired that he would be unable to perform the
essential functions of the job. In other words, he would be too impaired to
work.36

A recovering alcoholic or an active alcoholic whose work performance
is not affected could argue that he was 1) perceived as being disabled, or 2)
has a record of disability, as alternative paths to meeting the requirement of
having a disability for the purposes of the ADA.3 7 Although the courts'
interpretations likewise make these avenues unlikely, 38 if an alcoholic
plaintiff were to succeed at this point, under neither path would he likely be
entitled to a reasonable accommodation. 9
At the present time, most employers believe that they must accommodate an alcoholic and give him leave to go to treatment. 40 However, as this
article illustrates, courts are not protecting alcoholics under the ADA,
which will eventually lead to employers refusing the accommodation of
leave to go to treatment that has saved countless people from becoming
totally disabled by this debilitating illness. The threat of losing one's job is
a powerful incentive to get sober, and this will no longer be available.4'
Obviously, the ADA is asking the wrong question for alcoholism and
other similar impairments, such as diabetes and high blood pressure, that
without proper management are inevitably disabling.
With proper
treatment and management, under the courts' restrictive interpretations,
such impairments are not disabling. The question should be, how do we
enable such impaired employees to keep working? Congress clearly
34.
See David Olsky, Let Them Eat Cake: Diabetes and the Americans with
DisabilitiesAct After Sutton, 52 STAN. L. REv. 1829, 1847-48 (2000).
35.
In the case of alcoholics, these accommodations would include leave to go to
treatment, AA meetings, and/or counseling, and a second chance in the event of relapse. See
infra Section IV.B.2.c.
36.
Cases usually end today with the court deciding that the plaintiff is not disabled,
so the question of whether he could perform the duties of the job generally does not arise.
See infra Section IV.B.2.a.1)-3).
37.
42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
38.
See infra Section IV.B.2.a.2)-3).
39.
See infra Section IV.B.2.c.
40.
As indeed they must under the Family Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 26112615 (2000), but not under the ADA. Also, the FMLA defines employer as a person who
employs 50 or more employees and the ADA defines employer as a person who employs 15
or more employees, so the FMLA covers fewer employers than the ADA. Compare 29
U.S.C. § 261 l(4)(A) (2000) with 42 U.S.C. § 121 l1(5)(A) (2000). The fact that intended
beneficiaries of the ADA are protected by another statute is not a satisfactory solution.
41.
ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS, supra note 1, at 141-42.
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intended in enacting the ADA to enable disabled people to work. 42 The

courts have disconnected the ADA from its intent by construing the
protected class so narrowly that people who are managing their illnesses,
and who may need the smallest accommodations to do so, are excluded.4 3
Inevitably, when it becomes common knowledge that alcoholics are not
protected by the ADA, they will simply be fired when they need to go to
treatment.
This result is even more likely because, as one author has pointed out,
discrimination against the disabled is rational - that is, it may in fact cost
the employer more in time, money, and trouble to employ the disabled whereas other types of discrimination, such as race and sex discrimination,
are irrational forms of discrimination and cost the employer nothing to
avoid. 44 Another author has opined that critics of the ADA view it as "in
effect work[ing] as a subsidy paid by employers through 'reasonable
accommodation,' a subsidy likely to be borne disparately within the labor
market.",45 This author points out that this view does not take into account
that disability discrimination costs the U.S. billions of dollars and that there
are other hidden benefits to employing the disabled.46
This article will examine the disease of alcoholism generally in Section II, the ADA generally in Section III, and Supreme Court cases
interpreting the ADA and the lower court cases concerning alcoholism and
the ADA in Section IV. These sections will show that judicial interpretations have virtually eliminated alcoholism as a disability, contrary to
obvious Congressional intent. While this phenomenon is not limited to
alcoholism, it is a useful illustration of the damage judicial activism has
caused in this area.
Section V will analyze and propose a solution that can be accomplished without a change in the legislation. Requiring the plaintiff to prove
that he has an impairment that significantly limits a major life activity has
become an obstacle for most plaintiffs, but there are two alternatives to
entry into the protected class of disabled persons: being regarded as
disabled or having a record of a disability. 4 7 These provisions should be

interpreted more generously to prevent people from being discriminated

42.
Congress was concerned about the high unemployment rate among the disabled,
which according to one survey was thirty-nine percent. See Olsky, supranote 34, at 1841.
43. See infra Section IV.B.2.
44. See Bagenstos, Supreme Court, supra note 3, at 946-47. See Steven J.
Kaminshine, The Cost of Older Workers, DisparateImpact, and the Age Discriminationin
Employment Act, 42 FLA. L. REv. 229, 238-40 (1990) (discussing occasions when it may be
economically rational to classify employees by protected groups, although such classification is prohibited by law).
45. See Anderson, supra note 27, at 119.
46. Id. at 119-20.
47. See Section IV.B.2.a.2)-3).
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against because of perceived disabilities. People who are regarded as
disabled or who have a record of a disability are people who can work but
are being discriminated against because the employer thinks they cannot do
the job. Congress was very clear that this was the type of discrimination
that was intended to be especially prevented.48
Section VI concludes that once employers discover that their employees with impairments such as alcoholism are no longer protected by the
ADA, such employees may be terminated with impunity. The cost of this
eventuality is high in economic, as well as human, terms.
II.

ALCOHOLISM GENERALLY

Alcoholism is a primary, chronic disease with genetic, psychosocial, and environmental factors influencing its development and manifestations. The disease is often progressive and fatal. It is characterized by continuous or periodic
impaired control over drinking, preoccupation with the
drug alcohol, use of alcohol despite adverse consequences,
and distortions in thinking, mostly notable denial.49
There is no cure, and the only known treatment includes complete
abstinence. 50 Alcoholics remain as such, whether drinking or not; thus,
alcoholics are in either active addiction or in recovery for life. 5 The
rehabilitation process, whether inpatient or outpatient, requires two to four
weeks of intensive treatment, followed by three to six months of less
intense care. 52 In order to prevent relapse after rehabilitation, most
alcoholics, especially those in early recovery, require frequent attendance at

48.
See Arlene B. Mayerson, Restoring Regard for the "Regarded As" Prong:
Giving Effect to CongressionalIntent, 42 VILL. L. REv. 587, 592 (1997). In addition, the
author notes that the Supreme Court recognized that "the 'regarded as' prong acknowledges
that society's accumulated myths and fears about disability and diseases are as handicapping
as are the physical limitations that flow from actual impairment." Id. (citing School Board v.

Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284 (1987)).
49.

Daniel K. Flavin & Robert M. Morse, What Is Alcoholism?, 15 ALCOHOL
& RES. WORLD 266 (1991). There are some dissident views regarding the disease
concept of alcoholism. See Jaffe & Meyer, supra note 11, at 398-99.
50.
See Marc A. Schuckit, Alcohol-Related Disorders, in 1 KAPLAN & SADOCK'S
HEALTH

COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY

eds., 7th ed. 1999).
51.
See id.
52.
See id.

969 (Benjamin J. Sadock & Virginia A. Sadock
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meetings of Alcoholics Anonymous and/or counseling.5 3 Even then,
relapse is not uncommon and must be considered part of the syndrome.54
The principal societal belief is that alcoholics have caused their own
impairment. While this can be said of many impairments, 55 such as
56
diabetes and heart disease, society particularly frowns on alcoholics.
Because there is a genetic component to alcoholism that has yet to be fully
understood, 57 the idea that alcoholics are responsible for their own
impairment must be questioned. Further, since alcoholics probably have a
predisposition to the disease, the only probable way to avoid its manifestation, which is characterized by a loss of control and denial,58 is to never
take the first drink. Because ninety percent of the population of Western
countries drink alcohol at some time in their lives,59 generally beginning in
their early to mid-teens, alcohol consumption is "an almost ubiquitous
53.
See id.
54.
See id. "[R]ecovery is a process of trial and error; patients use slips when they
occur to identify high-risk [for relapse] situations and to develop more appropriate coping
techniques." Id.
55.
Smoking contributes to heart disease, as does being overweight. See RUSSELL
L. BLAYLOCK, HEALTH AND NUTRITION SECRETS THAT CAN SAVE YOUR LIFE 220 (2002).
Obesity is also an important factor in the development of diabetes. Id. at 181.
56.
See, e.g., Hobbs supra note 29. However, these attitudes may be changing. "A
recent Gallup poll found that almost 90 percent of Americans believe that alcoholism is a
disease." Id.
57.
See Schuckit, supra note 50, at 958-59.
One finding supporting the genetic conclusion is the threefold to fourfold increased risk for severe alcohol problems in close relatives of alcoholicpersons... The rate of similarity or concordance for severe alcohol-related problems is significantly higher in identical twins of alcoholic individuals than in fraternal twins in most studies. The adoptiontype studies have all revealed a significantly enhanced risk for alcoholism in the off-spring of alcoholic parents, even when the children had
been separated from their biological parents close to birth and raised
without any knowledge of the problems within the biological family.
Id.
58.
See Hobbs, supra note 29.
59.
Id.
[Thirty] percent or more of drinkers develop temporary alcohol-related
life problems. Severe, repetitive alcohol-related life impairment (i.e., alcohol dependence) is observed at some time during the lives of approximately 10 percent of men and 3 to 5 percent of women, with an additional 5 to 10 percent of each sex developing persistent but less intense
alcohol-related life problems that are diagnosed as abuse. Because high
levels of alcohol intake can cause diverse medical and psychiatric problems, it has been estimated that 20 to 35 percent of people seeking help
from a health care provider have alcohol abuse or dependence. Thus, alcohol-related problems are very common in society.
Id.at 953.
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phenomenon" in Western society. 60 Society is blaming the victim in the
case of alcoholics even though they are simply conforming to the norm in
their original consumption of alcohol. 6 Thus, the stereotypical view of
alcoholism as a volitional condition is most likely false.
The stereotypical alcoholic street person is also a false stereotype.6 2
Alcoholics usually have jobs and function moderately well in family
settings. 63 Because recovering alcoholics are likely to be able to work, they
generally may need three types of accommodations. The first is a leave of
absence to attend residential treatment. 64 The second is some accommodation that allows the employee to attend AA meetings and/or counseling
sessions.65 Iwould also venture to suggest a third accommodation, and that
is, a second chance if the alcoholic relapses. Because relapse is part of the

60. Id.at 958.
61.
See Sonja B. Starr, Note, Simple Fairness: Ending Discrimination in Health
Insurance Coverage ofAddiction Treatment, 111 YALE L.J. 2321, 2337 (2002).
The common perception of alcohol and drug addiction as self-inflicted
conditions accounts in large part for the social stigma that attaches to
them ...This perception is largely unjust; addiction is a disease with a
documented biological mechanism. Tendencies toward addiction may
also have a genetic component, which further undercuts the idea of voluntariness ....
Id. at 2335.
[Tihe instinct to blame the addict seems particularly arbitrary and unfair.
... The underlying hypocrisy behind the blame-the-addict approach is
most apparent with respect to alcohol, a product that is used openly and
without shame by most adult Americans. The stigma of addiction thus
does not attach merely to the behaviors giving rise to the illness, but to
the illness itself. The alcoholic is viewed in some way as weak-that is,
not capable of "handling" a substance that so many others have the ability to enjoy casually.
Id. at 2337.
62.
"[T]he stereotypical alcoholic person who is a homeless bum is very much the
exception rather than the rule, representing only 5 percent of all persons with severe,
recurring alcohol-related difficulties." Schuckit, supra note 50, at 954.
Id. at 953.
63.
64.
Id.at 969.
65.
Alcoholics may be better off asking for a reasonable accommodation under Title
VII. Ironically, reasonable accommodation under the religion provisions of Title VII was
specifically referred to in the ADA as not sufficiently generous to use as an analogy for
reasonable accommodation under the ADA. See infra text accompanying notes 88-89 and
note 93. However, because of the difficulties of proving a case under the ADA, an alcoholic
plaintiff might be better off asking for an accommodation to attend AA meetings under Title
VII. While AA is a spiritual, not a religious program, ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS, supra note
1, at 44-57, its belief in a power greater than oneself would qualify it as a religion under Title
VII. See C.F.R. § 1605.1 (2006) (religious practices include "moral or ethical beliefs as to
what is right and wrong which are sincerely held with the strength of traditional religious
views.").
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syndrome,66 alcoholics should be given at least one second chance. The
line has to be drawn, however, between second chances and multiple
chances, which may enable the alcoholic to continue to drink.
Congress expressly referred to alcoholism in the ADA.67 The cases
under the Rehabilitation Act recognized alcoholism as a per se disability,
and the early ADA cases followed suit. 68 Recent cases have uniformly
rejected the contention that alcoholism is disabling, however, leaving
alcoholism unprotected by the ADA. To understand how this has evolved, I
will turn to an explanation of the ADA generally, followed by the pertinent
cases.
III.
A.

THE ADA

STATUTORY PROVISIONS

The ADA is a comprehensive act to protect people with disabilities
from discrimination in public services, accommodations and telecommunications, as well as employment. 69 Title I applies to employment discrimination. 70 The ADA essentially follows the law developed under the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 7 1 which applied to federal contractors, the
federal government and federal grantees, 72 as well as the law 73 developed
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 74 The ADA's substantive
provisions are a combination of those statutory provisions as well. 7
The coverage is the same as Title VII, that is, the ADA applies to employers with more than fifteen employees. 76 The protected class consists of
any "qualified individual with a disability" who, with or without reasonable
accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the job.77 Disability

66.
See supratext accompanying note 54.
67.
42 U.S.C. § 12114 (2000).
68.
See infra notes 256-57.
69.
42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12102 (2000).
70.
42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117 (2000).
71.
29 U.S.C. §§ 705(2), 791, .793, 794, 794(a) (2000); See also Alex Long, State
Anti-DiscriminationLaw as a Modelfor Amending the Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 65
U. PIr. L. REv. 597, 607 (2004) ("The Rehabilitation Act served as the blueprint for the

ADA.").
793.

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

See Long, supra note 71, at 607-610; FRIEDMAN &

STRICKLER,

supra note 2, at

See Long, supra note 71, at 604; FRIEDMAN & STRICKLER, supra note 2, at 793.
42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) et seq. (2000).
See FRIEDMAN & STRICKLER, supranote 2, at 793.
Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (b) (2000) with 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5) (2000).
42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2000). The section provides as follows:
(8) Qualified individual with a disability
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means a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more
of an individual's major life activities, a record of impairment, or being
regarded as having such an impairment.78
Many of the provisions of the ADA were taken from Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964; 79 however, the discrimination provisions of the
ADA are much more specific. The ADA provides, analogously to Title
VII, that the employer may not discriminate against qualified persons with
disabilities on the basis of disability in job application procedures, hiring,
advancement, compensation, training and other terms or conditions of
employment. 8° The ADA adds specific provisions that prohibit employers
from asking questions regarding disabilities in pre-employment procedur82
ability to require pre-employment physicals,
es 81 and limit the employer's
83
except for drug tests.
The ADA also includes a provision identical to the provision of Title
VII that is the basis for disparate impact, which forbids practices that limit
opportunities for the disabled. 85 In addition, the ADA has language that
more expressly codifies the disparate impact theory by forbidding practices
that screen out or tend to screen out people with disabilities and practices

Id.

Id.

The term "qualified individual with a disability" means an individual
with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can
perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires. For the purposes of this subchapter, consideration shall be given to the employer's judgment as to what functions of a
job are essential, and if an employer has prepared a written description
before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job, this description
shall be considered evidence of the essential functions of the job.
78.

79.

42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000). The provision reads as follows:
The term "disability" means, with respect to an individual(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more
of the major life activities of such individual;
(B) a record of such an impairment; or
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000).

80.
Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000) with 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2000).
81.
42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(2) (2000).
82.
42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3) (2000). A pre-employment physical examination may
only be conducted after the employer has made an offer of employment and only if all
employees are required to take a physical. The provision imposes other restrictions on how
the information is used. Id.
83.
42 U.S.C. § 12114(d) (2000) provides that "a test to determine the illegal use of
drugs shall not be considered a medical examination."
84.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (2000).
85.
42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(1) (2000).
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that have the effect of discriminating, unless they are shown to be justified
by business necessity. 86
Defenses to an ADA claim include allowing the employer to demonstrate that any selection criterion that screens out "an individual with a
disability has been shown to be job-related and consistent with business
necessity, and such performance cannot be accomplished by reasonable
accommodation ... ,87 Although the requirement for reasonable accommodation that does not amount to an undue hardship mirrors the Title VII
requirement for religious accommodation,8 8 the ADA provides that undue
hardship is not to be defined with reference to Title VII.8 9 The ADA does
not define reasonable accommodation but rather lists possibilities such as:
redesigning facilities to make them accessible; restructuring the work
environment, requirements, assignments, schedules, and equipment; and
providing readers or interpreters. 90 While reasonable accommodation is not
specifically defined in the act, the examples given of reasonable accommodations make91 it clear that a reasonable accommodation can be fairly
burdensome.
Undue hardship "means an action requiring significant difficulty or
expense" on the part of the employer, when considered in light of a list of
factors, including the nature and cost of accommodation and the financial
resources of the facility. 92 The obvious conclusion is that
93 Congress
onerous.
be
hardship
undue
proving
of
burden
the
that
intended
86.
87.
88.
89.
religion to

90.
91.

Id.

42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6) (2000).
42 U.S.C. § 12113(a) (2000).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (2000).
The Court has interpreted the reasonable accommodation requirement for
be minimal. See infra note 93.

42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (2000).

Id.
The term "reasonable accommodation" may include(A) making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to
and usable by individuals with disabilities; and
(B) job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification of equipment or
devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications of examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of qualified readers or interpreters, and other similar accommodations for individuals with disabilities.

92.
42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(B) (2000). Subsection (B), which lists some of the
factors, states as follows:
In determining whether an accommodation would impose an undue
hardship on a covered entity, factors to be considered include(i) the nature and cost of the accommodation needed under this chapter;
(ii) the overall financial resources of the facility or facilities involved in
the provision of the reasonable accommodation; the number of persons
employed at such facility; the effect on expenses and resources, or the
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The other defenses to the ADA differ from Title VII. The ADA does
not contain a defense for bona fide seniority systems 94 or for a bona fide
occupational qualification. 95 Furthermore, unlike Title VII, under the ADA
the employer may require "that an individual shall not pose
a direct threat
96
to the health or safety" of other persons in the workplace.
Title VII's charge-filing and other enforcement procedures are incorporated into the ADA by the employment provisions of the ADA. 9 7 The

impact otherwise of such accommodation upon the operation of the facility;
(iii) the overall financial resources of the covered entity; the overall size
of the business of a covered entity with respect to the number of its employees; the number, type, and location of its facilities; and
(iv) the type of operation or operations of the covered entity, including
the composition, structure, and functions of the workforce of such entity;
the geographic separateness, administrative, or fiscal relationship of the
facility or facilities in question to the covered entity.
42 U.S.C. § 12111 (10)(B) (2000). Also in common with Title VII, the ADA has a defense
for a religious employer in hiring persons of a particular religion. Compare 42 U.S.C. §
12113(c) (2000) with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (2000).
93.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000). Title VII also requires that the employer
reasonably accommodate the religious practices of employees. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)
(2000). The requirement for reasonable accommodation under the ADA, however, was
intended to be more difficult to achieve. For a discussion of the difference in interpretation,
see US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 422 (2002) (Souter, J., dissenting). "The
legislative history also specifically rules out the majority's reliance on Trans World Airlines,
Inc. v. Hardison ..... Id. (citing H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 68 (1990), as reprinted in
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 350)("The Committee wishes to make it clear that the principles
enunciated by the Supreme Court in TWA v. Hardison are not applicable to this legislation."); S. Rep. No. 101-116, at 35 (1990)." See also Trans World Airlines, Inc. v.
Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977) (interpreting reasonable accommodation under Title VII).
The dissent in US Airways went on to say that the "House Report singles out Hardison's
equation of 'undue hardship' and anything more than a 'de minimus [sic] cost' as being
inapplicable to the ADA." US Airways, Inc., 535 U.S. at 422 n.2.
94.
The Supreme Court has, nevertheless, interpreted the ADA to provide a bona
fide seniority defense. US Airways, Inc., 535 U.S. at 391.
However, Title VII does contain such a defense. 42 U.S.C, § 2000e-2(e)
95.
(2000); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (2000). The BFOQ defense under Title VII only applies to
sex, religious and national origin discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1988). Race
discrimination cannot be defended as a BFOQ. See Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510
U.S. 17, 25-26 (1993) (Ginsburg, J., concurring). There are other defenses under Title VII
that are not contained in the ADA, such as action taken pursuant to a merit system or a
system which measures quantity or quality of production or a professionally developed test.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1988).

96.
42 U.S.C. § 12113(b) (2000). In addition, an employer may refuse to employ
one with certain infectious diseases in food handling occupations. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(d)

(2000).

97.

42 U.S.C. § 12209(5) (2000). Subsection (5) states as follows:
(5) Enforcement of employment rights
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Civil Rights Act of 1991 amended Title VII and the ADA to provide for
98
compensatory and punitive damages in intentional discrimination cases.

Id.

The remedies and procedures set forth in section 2000e-16 of this title
shall be available to any employee of an instrumentality of the Congress
who alleges a violation of the rights and protections under sections
12112 through 12114 of this title that are made applicable by this section, except that the authorities of the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission shall be exercised by the chief official of the instrumentality of the Congress.

The ADA also provides as follows:
(b) Coordination
The agencies with enforcement authority for actions which allege employment discrimination under this subchapter and under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 [29 U.S.C.A. § 701 et seq.] shall develop procedures to
ensure that administrative complaints filed under this subchapter and
under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 are dealt with in a manner that
avoids duplication of effort and prevents imposition of inconsistent or
conflicting standards for the same requirements under this subchapter
and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. The Commission, the Attorney General, and the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs shall establish such coordinating mechanisms (similar to provisions contained in
the joint regulations promulgated by the Commission and the Attorney
General at part 42 of title 28 and part 1691 of title 29, Code of Federal
Regulations, and the Memorandum of Understanding between the
Commission and the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs
dated January .16, 1981 (46 Fed.Reg. 7435, January 23, 1981)) in regulations implementing this subchapter and Rehabilitation Act of 1973 not
later than 18 months after July 26, 1990.
42 U.S.C. § 12117(b) (2000).
98.
42 U.S.C. § 1981a (2000) provides in pertinent part as follows:
(a) Right of recovery
(1) Civil rights ....
(2) Disability
In an action brought by a complaining party under the powers, remedies,
and procedures set forth in section 706 or 717 of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 [42 U.S.C. 2000e-5, 2000e-16] (as provided in section 107(a) of
the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. 12117(a)), and
section 794a(a)(1) of title 29, respectively) against a respondent who engaged in unlawful intentional discrimination (not an employment practice that is unlawful because of its disparate impact) under section 791 of
title 29 and the regulations implementing section 791 of Title 29, or who
violated the requirements of section 791 of title 29 or the regulations implementing section 791 of title 29 concerning the provision of a reasonable accommodation, or section 102 of the Americans with Disabilities
Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. 12112), or committed a violation of section
102(b)(5) of the Act, against an individual, the complaining party may
recover compensatory and punitive damages as allowed in subsection (b)
of this section, in addition to any relief authorized by section 706(g) of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, from the respondent.
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(3) Reasonable accommodation and good faith effort
In cases where a discriminatory practice involves the provision of a reasonable accommodation pursuant to section 102(b)(5) of the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990 [42 U.S.C. 12112(b)(5)] or regulations implementing section 791 of title 29, damages may not be awarded under
this section where the covered entity demonstrates good faith efforts, in
consultation with the person with the disability who has informed the
covered entity that accommodation is needed, to identify and make a
reasonable accommodation that would provide such individual with an
equally effective opportunity and would not cause an undue hardship on
the operation of the business.
(b) Compensatory and punitive damages
(1) Determination of punitive damages
A complaining party may recover punitive damages under this section
against a respondent (other than a government, government agency or
political subdivision) if the complaining party demonstrates that the respondent engaged in a discriminatory practice or discriminatory practices with malice or with reckless indifference to the federally protected
rights of an aggrieved individual.
(2) Exclusions from compensatory damages
Compensatory damages awarded under this section shall not include
backpay, interest on backpay, or any other type of relief authorized under section 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [42 U.S.C. 2000e5(g)].
(3) Limitations
The sum of the amount of compensatory damages awarded under this
section for future pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and other nonpecuniary
losses, and the amount of punitive damages awarded under this section,
shall not exceed, for each complaining party(A) in the case of a respondent who has more than 14 and fewer than
101 employees in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or
preceding calendar year, $50,000;
(B) in the case of a respondent who has more than 100 and fewer than
201 employees in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or
preceding calendar year, $100,000; and
(C) in the case of a respondent who has more than 200 and fewer than
501 employees in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or
preceding calendar year, $200,000; and
(D) in the case of a respondent who has more than 500 employees in
each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar
year, $300,000.
(4) Construction
Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit the scope of, or the relief available under, section 1981 of this title.
(c) Jury trial
If a complaining party seeks compensatory or punitive damages under
this section-(1) any party may demand a trial by jury; and
(2) the court shall not inform the jury of the limitations described in subsection (b)(3) of this section.
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However, the Amendment provides that if the employer acts in good faith
to provide a reasonable 99accommodation, the employer has a defense to the
imposition of damages.
Although the ADA specifically provides that it shall not be interpreted
less generously than its predecessor, the Rehabilitation Act, 1OO
the Supreme
Court has not taken this provision very seriously. The Court has substantially narrowed the interpretation of the term "disability" under the ADA in
all but one case, and that case is not an employment case. 10 1
B.

SUPREME COURT INTERPRETATIONS

1.

An individual with disabilities

10 2

a.

Bragdon v. Abbott

The Supreme Court's first foray into the ADA battle in 1998 appeared
to signal that it would read the Act expansively. The question in Bragdon
v. Abbott was whether a healthcare professional had the right to refuse to

(d) Definitions
As used in this section:
(1) Complaining party
The term "complaining party" means-(A) in the case of a person seeking to bring an action under subsection
(a)(1) of this section, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,
the Attorney General, or a person who may bring an action or proceed-.
ing under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e et
seq.); or
(B) in the case of a person seeking to bring an action under subsection
(a)(2) of this section, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,
the Attorney General, a person who may bring an action or proceeding
under section 794a(a)(1) of title 29, or a person who may bring an action
or proceeding under title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990 [42 U.S.C. 12111 et seq.].
(2) Discriminatory practice
The term "discriminatory practice" means the discrimination described
in paragraph (1), or the discrimination or the violation described in paragraph (2), of subsection (a) of this section.
42 U.S.C. § 1981a (2000).
99.
42 U.S.C. § 198la(a)(3) (2000).
100.
42 U.S.C. § 12201(a) (2000) (stating that "[elxcept as otherwise provided in this
chapter, nothing in this chapter shall be construed to apply a lesser standard than the
standards applied under title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 790 et seq.) or
the regulations issued by Federal agencies pursuant to such title").
101.
See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
102.
See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2000).
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treat an HIV positive patient in his office.'° 3 The Court explained that in
order to be protected by the ADA, the plaintiff had to be an individual with
a disability, which is defined as having an impairment that substantially
limits a major life activity. 10 4 The Court noted that the definition of
disability was derived from the Rehabilitation Act 10 5 and further noted that
the ADA requires that the definition be construed according to the law and
regulations developed under the Rehabilitation Act. 106 Consequently, the
Court adopted the definition of impairment that developed under the
regulations of the Rehabilitation Act, 107 which is a mental or physical
condition that affects one or more body systems. 108 The Court found that
HIV was an impairment at every stage because of the immediacy with
which the virus infects the blood cells and the severity of the disease. 109
Having determined that the plaintiff had an impairment, the Court then
considered whether the impairment substantially affected a major life
activity." 0 The Court cited the regulations, noting again that the ADA
103.
Id.(involving a dentist who offered to treat the patient in a hospital, but not in
his office).
104.
Id.at 630.
105. Id.at 631.
Id.
106.
The regulations referred to were promulgated by the HEW (Department of
107.
Health, Education and Welfare) because this was a public accommodation case, not an
employment case. Id.at 632. The EEOC regulations in this regard are identical. See 29
C.F.R. § 1630.2(h).
The Court quoted the regulations and commented as follows:
(A) any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or
anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following body systems:
neurological; musculoskeletal; special sense organs; respiratory, including speech organs; cardiovascular; reproductive, digestive, genitourinary; hemic and lymphatic; skin; and endocrine; or (B) any mental or
psychological disorder, such as mental retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning disabilities." 45
CFR § 84.3(j)(2)(i) (1997).

Bragdon,524 U.S. at 632.

Id.at 633.
108.
109.
110.

In issuing these regulations, HEW decided against including a list of
disorders constituting physical or mental impairments, out of concern
that any specific enumeration might not be comprehensive. 42 Fed.Reg.
22685 (1977), reprinted in 45 CFR pt. 84, App. A, p. 334 (1997). The
commentary accompanying the regulations, however, contains a representative list of disorders and conditions constituting physical impairments, including such diseases and conditions as orthopedic, visual,
speech, and hearing impairments, cerebral palsy, epilepsy, muscular dystrophy, multiple sclerosis, cancer, heart disease, diabetes, mental retardation, emotional illness, and... drug addiction and alcoholism.
Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 632.
Id.at 637.
Id.
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must be construed consistently with the Rehabilitation Act regulations."'
The ADA regulations, copied from the Rehabilitation Act regulations,
provide a representative list of major life activities which include "functions
such as caring for one's self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing,
hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working." '" 12 The Court
reasoned that reproduction, the major life activity alleged to be limited in
this case, is central to life and should be considered a major life activity. 113
The Court said that the regulations did not help to determine the meaning of
"substantially limited,"' 1 4 but concluded that "substantially limited" does
not mean utter inability. 1 5 The plaintiff was found to be substantially
limited because reproduction was dangerous to public health. "16 The Court
also bolstered its conclusion that asymptomatic AIDS was a handicap or
disability by reference to all of the courts and agencies that had so held
under the Rehabilitation Act.'
The Court stopped short of holding that
AIDS is a per se disability; nor did it hold that the determination of
disability would require an individualized inquiry, except by saying that, in
this case, the plaintiff alleged that she was substantially limited in reproduction. 118 The implication was that if reproduction were not at issue, a
plaintiff would have to identify another major life activity in which she was
substantially limited. The idea that an individualized inquiry would be
111.
Id. at 638.
112. Id. at 638-39 (citing 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii) (1997); 28 C.F.R. § 41.31(b)(2)
(1997)). The dissent disagreed that reproduction is a major life activity, but agreed that this
list is incorporated by reference into the ADA. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 659 (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
113.
Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 638.
114. Id. at 639-41. However, the EEOC regulations have a definition of substantially
limited. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(ii) (2000).
115.
Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 641.
116.
Id.
117. Id. at 642-45. The Court reasoned:
We find the uniformity of the administrative and judicial precedent construing the definition significant. When administrative and judicial interpretations have settled the meaning of an existing statutory provision,
repetition of the same language in a new statute indicates, as a general
matter, the intent to incorporate its administrative and judicial interpretations as well. See, e.g., Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580-81. The uniform body of administrative and judicial precedent confirms the conclusion we reach today as the most faithful way to effect the congressional
design.
Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 645.
118.
The ADA also requires that in order to be covered by the ADA, the person not
pose a direct threat. The Court ultimately decided that whether the plaintiff posed a direct
threat must be decided based on objective reasonableness, not the health care professional's
subjective judgment. Id. at 649. To make this determination, the Court remanded for more
conclusive evidence. See id. at 655.
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9 The Court made
required in every case originated in the dissent. 11
it clear
in a subsequent case that a strict individualized inquiry is necessary to
determine whether the plaintiff is disabled
and that there are no per se or
20
presumptively disabling impairments. 1

b.

Sutton v. UnitedAir Lines and Companions

1)

Sutton

Sutton v. United Air Lines involved two sisters who applied for jobs as
commercial airline pilots.' 2' They were told that they did not meet the
minimum requirement for uncorrected eyesight, which was 20/100.122 The
plaintiffs' eyesight was significantly worse than that, although it was
corrected to 20/20 with corrective lenses.123 The first question before the
Court was whether the plaintiffs' visual impairment would be viewed in its
corrected or uncorrected 24state to determine whether the plaintiffs were
disabled under the ADA. 1
The Court started out by saying that the EEOC had issued regulations
defining disability, although no agency had been delegated authority to do
so. 125 The conflict was not with regard to the regulations, but with the
119.
Id.at 657 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Id. at 664-65
(O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part.). InSutton v.
United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 483 (1999), the Court cited Bragdon to support its
adoption of a strict individualized test:
The definition of disability also requires that disabilities be evaluated
"with respect to an individual" and be determined based on whether an
impairment substantially limits the "major life activities of such individual." § 12102(2). Thus, whether a person has a disability under the ADA
is an individualized inquiry. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 641642, 118 S.Ct. 2196, 141 L.Ed.2d 540 (1998) (declining to consider
whether HIV infection is aper se disability under the ADA).
Id.
120.
Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
121. Id.at 475.
122. Id.at 476.
123. Id.at 475.
124.
Id.at 477-78. For an interesting view on how the Court crafted the decision, see
Mark C. Rahdert, Arline's Ghost: Some Notes on Working as a Major Life Activity Under
the ADA, 9 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REv. 303 (2000).
125.
Sutton, 527 U.S. at 481. This statement seems to contradict Bragdon v. Abbott,
inwhich the Court noted that the Act required itto construe the ADA according to the HEW
regulations defining disability. See supra discussion accompanying note 107. For a good
discussion of the issue of the deference owed to the EEOC regulations under the ADA, see
Lisa Eichhorn, The Chevron Two-Step and the Toyota Sidestep: Dancing Around the
EEOC's "Disability" Regulations under the ADA, 39 WAKE FoREST L. REv. 177 (2004)
[hereinafter Eichhorn, Dancing].
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EEOC guidance interpreting the regulations. The Court noted that the
EEOC defined disability, as did the ADA, as " 'A) a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more of such the major life
activities of such individual; B) a record of an impairment; or C) being
regarded as having such an impairment.' "126 The plaintiffs alleged first that
they were disabled under subsection A), the first prong of the disability test,
because they suffered from an impairment that substantially limited a major
life activity. 127 The EEOC guidance directed that disability should be
determined in its uncorrected state. 12 8 Because the plaintiffs were severely
myopic, they clearly would be disabled if the measure was made in
reference to the uncorrected state. The Court, however, decided that the
EEOC guidance conflicted with the plain language of the ADA, and to
evaluate persons "in their hypothetical uncorrected state . . . is an impermissible interpretation of the ADA."' 129 The Court reasoned that the statute
expressed disability in the present tense, "substantially limits;,"' 30 and that
the inquiry is individualized, so that the question is whether the individual
is currently disabled. 131 However, the Court was unduly impressed by the
fact that Congress had determined that 43 million people were disabled, and
if mitigating
measures were not considered, the figure would be much
132
higher.
Thus, the Court concluded that the plaintiffs had an impairment which,
in its corrected state, did not substantially limit any major life activity.133
Thus, the plaintiffs were not disabled under the first prong of the Act.
126.
Sutton, 527 U.S. at 478 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994)).
127.
See id.at 481.
128.
Id. at 481.
129.
Id.
130.
Id.at 482.
131.
Sutton, 527 U.S. at 483.
132.
Id. at 487.
133.
See id. at 482-83, 485, 487. The Court made this determination by using three
provisions of the ADA:
[1] The Act defines a "disability" as "a physical or mental impairment
that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities" of an individual. § 12102(2)(A) (emphasis added). Because the phrase "substantially limits" appears in the Act in the present indicative verb form, we
think the language is properly read as requiring that a person be presently--not potentially or hypothetically--substantially limited in order to
demonstrate a disability. A "disability" exists only where an impairment
"substantially limits" a major life activity, not where it "might," "could,"
or "would" be substantially limiting if mitigating measures were not
taken. A person whose physical or mental impairment is corrected by
medication or other measures does not have an impairment that presently
"substantially limits" a major life activity.
Id. at 482-83.
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The plaintiffs argued alternatively under subsection (C) of the disability test that they were regarded as disabled by the employer.' 34 The Court
said that there were two possibilities that could arise under this part of the
ADA; either the employee has an impairment that is not substantially
limiting, or the employee has no impairment at all. 135
In either situation, the employer must believe that the impairment is
substantially limiting.136 The plaintiffs alleged that the
employer regarded
37
them as disabled in the major life activity of working.
The Court restricted the category of "working" very narrowly, based
on the EEOC regulations. 138 Thus, being substantially limited in the major
life activity of working, the Court said, requires:
at a minimum, that plaintiffs allege they are unable to work
in a broad class of jobs. Reflecting this requirement, the
EEOC uses a specialized definition of the term "substantially limits" when referring to the major life activity of
working : "significantly restricted in the ability to perform
either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various
classes as compared to the average person having comparable training, skills and abilities. The inability to perform a

Id.at 483.

[2] The definition of disability also requires that disabilities be evaluated "with respect to an individual" and be determined based on whether
an impairment substantially limits the "major life activities of such individual." § 12102(2) ...The agency guidelines' directive that persons be
judged in their uncorrected or unmitigated state runs directly counter to
the individualized inquiry mandated by the ADA. The agency approach
would often require courts and employers to speculate about a person's
condition and would, in many cases, force them to make a disability determination based on general information about how an uncorrected impairment usually affects individuals, rather than on the individual's actual condition.
[3] "Congress found that 'some 43,000,000 Americans have one or more
physical or mental disabilities.. .' § 12101(a)(1)." Bragdon,527 U.S. at
484. Had Congress intended to include all persons with corrected physical limitations among those covered by the Act, it undoubtedly would
have cited a much higher number of disabled persons in the findings.
That it did not is evidence that the ADA's coverage is restricted to only
those whose impairments are not mitigated by corrective measures.

Id.at 487.
134.
Sutton, 527 U.S. at 489.
135.
See id.
at 489.
136.
Id.at 489. It should be noted that the Court had said earlier that the EEOC did
not have authority to issue the regulations. Id.at 481. At this point, the guidance suited the
Court's purpose, so it was assumed without deciding that they were valid. Id. at 492-93.
137.
Id.at 490.
138.
Sutton, 527 U.S. at 491-92.
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single, particular job does not constitute a substantial
limi139
working."'
of
activity
life
major
the
in
tation
The Court concluded that the plaintiffs were only precluded from one
job, that of global airline pilot, so they were not regarded as substantially
limited in working. 140 The Court expressed reluctance to even regard
"working" as a major life activity.
Because the parties accept that the term "major life activities" includes working, we do not determine the validity of
the cited regulations. We note, however, that there may be
some conceptual difficulty in defining "major life activities" to include work, for it seems "to argue in a circle to
say that if one is excluded, for instance, by reason of [an
impairment, from working with others] ... then that exclusion constitutes an impairment, when the question you're
asking is, whether the exclusion itself is by reason of
handicap." 141
The Court then "assumed without deciding" that working is a major life
activity 142 and has continued to do so since. 143
2)

Implications of Sutton

The Court's refusal to fully accept working as a major life activity is
inconsistent with the Court's acceptance of the identical language in the
HEW regulations construing the Rehabilitation Act and cited in Bragdon v.
139.
Id. at 491 (citing § 1630.20)(3)(i)). The Court further noted:
The EEOC further identifies several factors that courts should consider
when determining whether an individual is substantially limited in the
major life activity of working. including the geographical area to which
the individual has reasonable access, and "the number and types of jobs
utilizing similar training, knowledge, skills or abilities, within the geographical area, from which the individual is also disqualified." §§
1630.2(j)(3)(ii)(A), (B). To be substantially limited in the major life activity of working, then, one must be precluded from more than one type
of job, a specialized job, or a particular job of choice. If jobs utilizing an
individual's skills (but perhaps not his or her unique talents) are available, one is not precluded from a substantial class of jobs. Similarly, if a
host of different types of jobs are available, one is not precluded from a
broad range ofjobs.
Id.at 491-92.
140.
Id. at 493..
141.
Id. at 492.
142.
Sutton, 527 U.S. at 492.
143.
See Toyota Motor Mfg. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 200 (2002).
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Abbott as controlling. 144 In addition, there is no question that working
represents an activity of central importance to most people's lives; as one
commentator has stated, "[w]orking is a major part of being 'normal' in our
society."' 14 1 Comparing working to the other life activities that the Court
has recognized as "major life activities," such as "household chores,
bathing and brushing one's teeth,"' 46 and reproduction, 47 working must
certainly be included from a rational point of view. Furthermore, the
agency interpretations, which are binding under the ADA, have always
included it. 148 Therefore, the Court did not continue its indulgent interpretation of the ADA that originated in Bragdon.
The Court in Sutton also made it clear that there were no per se disabilities, citing Bragdon v. Abbott for the proposition. 149 In fact, Bragdon
v. Abbott did not require a strict individualized inquiry, but instead relied
heavily on authority that considered asymptomatic HIV a disability in every
case. 150 The only individualized inquiry was in which major life activity
the plaintiff was restricted. The plaintiff in Bragdon alleged that she was
restricted in reproduction, but the Court indicated that there could be other
restrictions, such as sexual activity. 151 The Court was clearly assuming in
the Bragdon case that HIV would be disabling in every case, although it
might affect different major life activities. Beginning with the Sutton case,
however, the Court started to chart its own course, ignoring legislative
144.
See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 632-33. In addition, "working" was also included in
the list of major life activities from the Senate and House Committee reports on the ADA.
See Burgdorf, supra note 15, at 438.
145.
See Bagenstos, Subordination, supra note 28, at 506 ("Working is 'a means of
proving yourself worthy in your own eyes and in the eyes of others' .... People who cannot
work because of their impairments are therefore likely to experience prejudice. . .and
neglect ... ").
Toyota, 534 U.S. at 202.
146.
Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 638.
147.
148.
See Bagenstos, Subordination, supra note 28, at 409-10 (citing, inter alia, 42
U.S.C. § 12201(a) (1994)):
The ADA expressly incorporates the regulations the Executive Branch
had previously promulgated to implement the... Rehabilitation Act of
1973. Even if the regulations promulgated under the ADA were not
themselves entitled to deference, therefore, the Court has made clear
that the substantively identical regulations promulgated under the Rehabilitation act would nonetheless provide a floor below which the
ADA's coverage could not drop.
149.
See Sutton, 527 U.S. 471, 483 (1999) ("The definition of disability also requires
that disabilities be evaluated 'with respect to an individual' and be determined based on
whether an impairment substantially limits the major life activities of such individual. §
12102(2). Thus, whether a person has a disability under the ADA is an individualized
inquiry.").
150.
See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 633.
151.
Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 643.
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history, agency regulations and guidelines, and case law developed under
the Rehabilitation Act. The legislative history is clear that Congress
intended that disability be determined in its
uncorrected state, and all the
2
so.15
held
had
Act
the
interpreting
agencies
The Court took an easy case and made bad law. No one wants the
ADA to protect everyone who has to wear glasses. It obviously trivializes
the protected class; however, the ramifications of Sutton go far beyond the
population of people wearing corrective lenses. The Court has been
criticized for placing so much reliance on the number of disabled people
cited by Congress, a figure that was posited to be inclusive, rather than
exclusive, of disability.'5 3 Why did the Supreme Court exalt the figure
cited by Congress of 43 million disabled people over the much more
important congressionally expressed remedial objectives of the ADA?
The Sutton dissenters had the better view:
We must draw a statutory line that either (1) will include
within the category of persons authorized to bring suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 some
whom Congress may not have wanted to protect (those
who wear ordinary eyeglasses), or (2) will exclude from the
threshold category those whom Congress certainly did
want to protect (those who successfully use corrective devices or medicines, such as hearing aids or prostheses or
medicine for epilepsy). Faced with this dilemma, the statute's language, structure, basic purposes, and history require us to chqose the former statutory line, as Justice
STEVENS (whose opinion I join) well explains. I would
add that, if the more generous choice of threshold led to too
many lawsuits that ultimately proved without merit or otherwise drew too much time and attention away from those
whom54 Congress clearly sought to protect, there is a remedy. 1

152.
See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 499-502 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
153.
In addition, the 43 million figure was derived from sources that define disability
differently from the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA. See Lisa Eichhorn, Applying the ADA
to MitigatingMeasures Cases:A Case of Statutory Evils, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1071, 1113 (1999)
[hereinafter Eichhom, Mitigating]. See also Anderson, supra note 27, at 107 ("The Court
majority can be criticized for over-relying on an estimate of the number of people with
disabilities, an estimate whose validity was questioned by its own sources .... Congress's
reference to 43 million individuals with disabilities should be seen as a signal of inclusion,
not exclusion.").
154.
Sutton, 527 U.S. at 513-14 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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As the dissent explained, the Act was not supposed to "weed people
out" in the first instance. It would not require, for example, that airlines
hire people who pose a danger to others; rather, the Act requires that
employers justify their employment requirements. 55
3)

Companion case

Had the Court used one of the companion cases 156 to Sutton to express
its unauthorized interpretation of the ADA, namely Albertson's Inc. v.
Kirkingburg,'5 7 it would have been more obvious that clearly intended
beneficiaries of the ADA would lose protection. In the Kirkingburg case,
the plaintiff suffered from amblyobia, an uncorrectable ailment that limited
him to seeing out of only one eye. 158 Kirkingburg had been erroneously
hired as a truck driver because his employer required that all drivers meet
the Department of Transportation requirements, yet he could not. 159 He
drove for over a year before the mistake was discovered, and he was
subsequently fired. 160 Kirkingburg obtained a waiver of the requirement
from the Department of Transportation, but the employer would not accept
it and refused to re-hire him. 16' The question before the Court was whether
the employer was justified in relying on the DOT requirements, which a
unanimous Court answered in the affirmative because the DOT waiver
62
program was experimental and not designed to certify safe drivers. 1
The pernicious part of the opinion was the Court's unscrupulous chastisement of the lower court for so easily finding that Kirkingburg was
disabled in the first place. 163 The Court held that the lower court had made
three missteps in its finding that Kirkingburg was disabled. 164 First, the
Court said that although amblyopia is an impairment and "seeing" is a
155.
Sutton, 527 U.S. at 503-04 (majority opinion).
156.
The third case decided along with Sutton was Murphy v. United ParcelService,
527 U.S. 516 (1999), in which the Court affirmed the lower court's holding that the plaintiff
was not disabled by hypertension because of mitigating measures. In addition, the Court
reiterated the holding in Sutton that to be "regarded as disabled" in the major life activity of
working, the plaintiff would have be foreclosed from a range of jobs. Murphy, 527 U.S. at
521-522. In this case, the plaintiff was regarded as unable to perform a mechanic's job that
also required driving a commercial vehicle, but he could perform other mechanic's jobs. Id.
at 524-525.
157.
527 U.S. 555 (1999).
158.
Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. at 559.
159.
The Act allows employers to rely on governmental requirements. See infra note
241.
160. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. at 560.
161. Id.
162.
Id. at 558.
163.
See Kirkingburg,527 U.S. at 573-76.
164. Id. at 564-67.
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major life activity, a person with that impairment is not necessarily
substantially limited in seeing. 165 The lower court had in fact said that "the
manner in which [Kirkingburg] sees differs significantly from the manner

in which most people see" because, "[t]o put it in its simplest terms [he]
sees using only one eye; most people see using two."' 66 The Court
characterized this determination as the lower court appearing to be "willing
to settle for a mere difference." 167 This clearly contradicts the lower court's
holding in this regard and ups the bar for the finding of "significantly
limited" in a major life activity.
Secondly, the Court found fault with the lower court's view that it was
irrelevant whether the plaintiff had made subconscious compensation for
his monocular vision. 168 The Court reiterated from Sutton that mitigating
measures, even if produced by the body and not by artificial aids, must be
taken into account. 169 Finally, the Court said that the lower court did not
pay sufficient heed to the requirement of an individualized inquiry.17 0 The
Court said, "[s]ome impairments may invariably cause a substantial
limitation of a major life activity .... we cannot say that monocularity
does."' 7' 1 Again, it should be noted that the lower court clearly said that
165.
Id.at 565.
166.
Id. at 564 (citing Kirkingburg v. Albertson's, Inc., 143 F.3d 1228 (9th Cir.
1998) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court said that the lower court had cited the EEOC
definition of "substantially limits," which requires a "significant restriction as to the
condition, manner or duration under which an individual can perform a particular major life
activity as compared to the condition, manner, or duration under which the average person in
the general population can perform that same major life activity." Id.at 563-64 (citing 29
C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(ii) (2000)).
The lower court had also said that:
Kirkingburg's inability to see out of one eye affects his peripheral visions and his depth perception. Although his brain has developed subconscious mechanisms for coping with this visual impairment and thus
his body compensates for his disability, the manner in which he sees differs significantly from the manner in which most people see.
Kirkingburg v. Albertson's, Inc., 143 F.3d 1228, 1232 (9th Cir. 1998).
167.
Kirkingburg,527 U.S. at 565.
168.
Id.
169.
Id.at 565-66.
170.
Id.at 566.
171.
Id. The Court said:
[t]hat category, as we understand it, may embrace a group whose members vary by the degree of visual acuity in the weaker eye, the age at
which they suffered their vision loss, the extent of their compensating
adjustments in visual techniques, and the ultimate scope of the restrictions on their visual abilities. These variables are not the stuff of a per se
rule. While monocularity inevitably leads to some loss of horizontal
field of vision and depth perception (footnote omitted) consequences the
Ninth Circuit mentioned (citation omitted) the court did not identify the
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Kirkingburg could essentially see out of only one eye; it is incredible that
the Supreme Court should require more. The Court did ultimately concede
that monocular vision would ordinarily be disabling, but its analysis is
nevertheless very troubling.' 72 The Court was clearly requiring much more
than was generally required under prior law to show that a person was
substantially limited in a major life activity. The Court was not even
finished in this regard, as Toyota Motor Mfg. v. Williams demonstrates.
c.

Toyota Motor Mfg. v. Williams

The Court returned to defining "substantially limited" in a "major life
activity" in Toyota Motor Mfg. v. Williams. 173 The plaintiff in Williams had
used pneumatic tools while working for the defendant, which caused her to
suffer from carpal tunnel syndrome and tendonitis.174 She was placed on
permanent work restrictions that precluded, among other things, lifting
more than 20 pounds, using vibratory tools, engaging in repetitive flexion
of her wrists or elbows or performing overhead work. 75 The plaintiff was
initially accommodated in a job that did not require any of this; however,
extra duties were added to the job that she could not perform, and she was
ultimately discharged. 176 Clearly, the plaintiff was disabled, but she had a
problem identifying the major life activity that would allow her to prove
that she was disabled.
She started out arguing that her impairment substantially limited her in
the major life activities of performing manual tasks, housework, gardening,
playing with her children, lifting, and working. 177 She also argued that she
"had a record of a substantially limiting impairment and that she was
regarded as having such an impairment."' 178 The district court decided that
playing with her children, gardening and doing housework were not major
life activities, and the plaintiff did not dispute that finding.' 7 9 She did
appeal the finding that she was not substantially limited in lifting, working

degree of loss suffered by Kirkingburg, nor are we aware of any evidence in the record specifying the extent of his visual restrictions.
Id.at 566-67.
172.
Id. at 567.
173.
534 U.S. 184 (2002).
174.
Toyota, 534 U.S. at 187.
175.
Id.at 187-88.
176.
Id. at 189-90. The parties disagree about how this came about. The plaintiff
alleges that she was forced to continue doing the duties that caused her condition to worsen.
The defendant contends that she started missing work and was fired for poor attendance. Id.
177.
Toyota, 534 U.S. at 190.
178.
Id.
179.
Id.at 190-92.
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and performing manual tasks. 180 The Sixth Circuit subsequently reversed
the finding that she was not substantially limited in her ability to perform
manual tasks. 181 The Sixth Circuit said that she had shown a class of
manual activities that she could not perform at work. 182 The appellate court
then cited a range of activities that she could not perform, not just in her
own job, but in various related jobs. Those included assembly line jobs,
manual product handling jobs, and manual building trade jobs that require
hands and arms extended over the
gripping tools and repetitive work 8with
3
shoulder for any extended periods. 1
The Supreme Court limited its consideration of Williams to the "manual tasks" holding of the lower court and held that the lower court had erred
in assessing whether she was disabled by looking at what work she could
perform, instead of whether she could take care of her personal hygiene and
carry out personal or household chores.184 The Court proceeded to define
major life activities as those that are of central importance to daily life:
"That these terms need to be interpreted strictly to create a demanding
standard for qualifying as disabled is confmned by the first section of the
ADA."' 185 The Court again cited for this proposition the reference to there
being 43 million disabled persons in the U.S., which is noted in the
preamble to the Act that the Court had relied on in Sutton.186 The Court
said that to be significantly limited in a major life activity, an impairment
must prevent or severely restrict the person from performing activities that
are of central importance to most peoples' lives. 187 The Court noted that
occupation-specific tasks are not necessarily of central importance to most
peoples' lives, while "household chores, bathing and brushing one's teeth"
are. 188 Since the plaintiff had said that she could still perform all these
activities, even though she had difficulty sweeping, had to occasionally
have help in dressing, and could not play with her children or drive for long
periods, the Court held that the plaintiff was not so "severely" restricted in
activities that are of central89importance to most people's lives to amount to
a "manual task" disability. 1
Id.at 191.
180.
181.
Id.
Id.at 192.
182.
Toyota, 534 U.S. at 192. The Court expressed no opinion on whether working,
183.
lifting, and other life activities preserved for appeal below were major life activities. Id.
Id.at 197-98.
184.
185.
Id.at 197.
Id.
186.
Toyota, 534 U.S. at 198 (emphasis added).
187.
188.
Id.at 201-02.
189.
Id. See also Curtis D. Edmonds, Snakes and Ladders: Expanding the
Definition of "MajorLife Activity " in the Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 33 TEXAS TECH L.
REv. 321, 325 (2002), for a good discussion of how restrictively the courts are interpreting
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Having again severely restricted plaintiffs in their ability to prove that
they are disabled in employment cases, the Court proceeded to decide
several cases that do not deal with the definition of "disability." These
cases, however, do illustrate the point that the Court has been hostile to
employees in its interpretation of the ADA.
2.

Other cases decided under Title I that expand the employer's ability to
defeat an ADA claim

In Chevron v. Echazabal, the Supreme Court looked at the meaning of
the "direct threat" defense.190 The Act defines discrimination as, among
other things, using "qualification standards ... that screen out or tend to
screen out an individual with a disability" unless the qualification standard
is job-related and consistent with business necessity. 191 The Act further
provides that an employer may have a qualification standard that "an
individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other
individuals in the workplace."' 92 The defendant in Chevron had rejected
the plaintiff for employment based on a liver condition that the defendant's
physicians said would be exacerbated by contact with toxins in the refinery
where the plaintiff worked.' 93
Upon review, the Court in Chevron noted that the EEOC regulations
"allowed an employer to screen out a potential worker with a disability not
only for risks that he would pose to others in the workplace but for risks on
the job to his own health or safety as well."' 194 The Court determined that
the EEOC's interpretation of the Act was reasonable. 195 The Court did not
find persuasive the legislative history of the Act that indicated Congress'
concern for paternalism in enacting the Act or the plain language of the
statute, that the direct threat defense was limited to a direct threat to

major life activity, and Eichhom, Dancing, supra note 125, for a discussion of how the
Court's failure to defer properly to EEOC regulations and guidelines caused it to adopt a
much more restrictive view of "substantially limited."
190.
536 U.S. 73 (2002).
191.
42 U.S.C. § 12113(a) (1990).
192.
42 U.S.C. § 12113(b) (1990).
193.
Chevron, 536 U.S. at 76.
194.
Id. at 78.
195.
Id. at 85.
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others. 196 As in Sutton, the Court approved of the EEOC's interpretation
when it restricted the protected class.' 97
In another defeat for plaintiffs, the Supreme Court in Raytheon v. Hernandez, 198 applied its interpretation of the defense of "legitimate nondiscriminatory reason" to the ADA. In the Raytheon case, the plaintiff had
been discharged for violating work rules by testing positive for drugs. 199
Two years later, he applied again and was denied employment. 200 The
defendant first stated it was because of the plaintiffs past drug use, but
ultimately decided to interpose the defense of a neutral policy that
precluded rehiring anyone who had been discharged for misconduct. 20 '
The Court said that this was a legitimate non-discriminatory reason.20 2
"Legitimate, non-discriminatory reason" was developed by the Court
as a defense to intentional discrimination - commonly called disparate
treatment cases under Title VII; 20 3 however, it may not be an appropriate
196.
536 U.S. at 80-84. See also Lisa Eichhorn, Major Litigation Activities
Regarding Major Life Activities: The Failure of the "Disability" Definition in the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990, 77 N.C. L. REv. 1405, 1417-18 (1999) [hereinafter Eichhorn,
Major] and Bagenstos, Supreme Court, supra note 3, at 933 for discussions of the disability
movement's concern regarding paternalism.
197.
Compare the Court's treatment of the EEOC's regulations with regard to
working, i.e. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 492, with the Court's treatment of the EEOC guidance with
regard to mitigating measures, Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482-83.
198.
540 U.S. 44 (2003).
199.
The plaintiff was forced by his employer to resign. Raytheon, 540 U.S. at 47.
200.
Id.
201.
540 U.S. at 54-55 (2003).
202.
Id.at 54-55.
203.
McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
Legitimate non-discriminatory reason is a judicially-created defense to a
disparate treatment case that the Court developed under Title VII. Because Congress
provided little guidance for analyzing a circumstantial evidence case of disparate treatment
under Title VII, see Judith J. Johnson, Rehabilitate the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act: Resuscitate the "Reasonable Factors Other than Age" Defense and the Disparate
Impact Theory, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 1399, 1419 (2004).
The Court developed the legitimate nondiscriminatory reason defense as the
model of proof for disparate treatment in McDonnell Douglas. In establishing a prima facie
case, the plaintiff must show that 1) he was a member of a protected class; 2) he applied and
was qualified for a position for which the employer was seeking applicants; 3) despite his
qualifications, he was rejected; and 4) the employer continued to seek applicants with the
plaintiff's qualifications. Id.at 802. Once the employer produces evidence of a legitimate
non-discriminatory reason, the plaintiff bears the burden of persuading the court that the
reason given by the employer was not the true reason for the employer's action, but rather
was a pretext for discrimination. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 514-15 (1993).
In St. Mary's, the Court said that the trier of fact may resolve the ultimate issue of
discrimination vel non based on its disbelief of the employer's reason for its action, but that such
disbelief does not necessarily satisfy the plaintiff's ultimate burden of proving discrimination.
Id.at 518-19. The plaintiff must prove not only that the employer's reasons were untrue, but
that they were a pretext for discrimination. Id.
at 5 14-15.
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defense to all disparate treatment cases under the ADA. Any reason that is
not based on the plaintiffs protected status is a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason under Title VII. 2° 4 The ADA, however, provides that
the employer may not have a policy that screens out people with the
plaintiffs disability unless the policy is justified by business necessity.2 °5
Because the no-rehire policy screens out people with the plaintiffs
disability, the employer should have been required to justify it, even in a
disparate treatment case. However, the Court has now put the burden on
the plaintiff to show that the defendant's use of the policy was not a
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason.20 6
The Court criticized the court of appeals for conflating the two theories of disparate treatment and disparate impact and holding that a neutral
policy is not a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason if it has a disparate
impact on the protected class.207 The Supreme Court is actually doing the
conflating by treating disparate treatment under Title VII and disparate
treatment under the ADA the same. Under Title VII, the defendant
discriminates if he treats a member of a protected class differently from a
member of another class. Under the ADA, the defendant may be guilty of
204.
See Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993).
205.
See supra discussion accompanying notes 84-85.
206.
The lower court was correct in holding that because the no re-hire policy
screened out former drug addicts, who are protected under the Act, the no-hire policy could
not be a legitimate non-discriminatory reason. Raytheon v. Hernandez 540 U.S. 44, 49
(2003). The Supreme Court reiterated its previously stated conclusion that "legitimate nondiscriminatory reason" means any reason that does not discriminate on its face; thus a
neutral policy will always serve as a defense. See Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. 604. This case
was decided under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, in which the Court noted
that a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason or a "factor other than age" can be any reason,
regardless of how improper or illegal, as long as it does not violate the particular act under
which the plaintiff is suing. Id. at 610-11. The defendant's neutral policy in the Raytheon
case was thus a legitimate non-discriminatory reason that the plaintiff must prove is a pretext
for discrimination. Raytheon, 540 U.S. at 53-54.
207.
Raytheon, 540 U.S. at 52. The district court had characterized the plaintiffs
attack on the employer's employment policy as based on the disparate impact theory and
foreclosed the argument because of timeliness. In fact, the defendant had not interposed the
neutral employment policy as the reason for its action until later in discovery, at which time
the court would not allow the plaintiff to amend the complaint and allege disparate impact.
Id. at 49. The Supreme Court developed the disparate impact theory under Title VII in
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), to preclude the use of neutral practices and
procedures that disproportionately impact the protected class. Id. at 430. Such practices can
be defended if the defendant can prove that they are job-related and consistent with business
necessity. See Johnson, supra note 203, at 1410 for a discussion of disparate impact under
Title VII. Unlike the model of proof for disparate treatment, however, the model of proof
for disparate impact is codified in the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6) (2000). On remand,
the court decided that there was enough for a jury to believe that the employer was
discriminating based on the plaintiffs alcoholism and not because of a neutral policy.
Hernandez v. Hughes Missile Systems Co., 362 F.3d 564 (2004).

2007]

RESCUE THE ADA FROM RESTRICTIVE INTERPRETATIONS

discrimination if he does not treat disabled people differently from nondisabled people.2 °8 The employer must offer reasonable accommodation to
disabled people. 20 9 In addition, the non-discrimination requirement of the
ADA requires that the employer not maintain policies that screen out
disabled people. 210 The Raytheon Court determined that the latter defense
is implicated only in a disparate impact case. 211 This contradicts the
decision in Chevron v. Echazabal, in which the Court allowed the
defendant to interpose the business necessity defense, which is the defense
to a disparate impact case, in a case that involved disparate treatment.21 2
Having severely restricted the plaintiffs ability to prove discrimination under the employment provisions of the ADA, the Court turned to a
delineation of "reasonable accommodation without undue hardship." The
Court's entry into this area was in a non-employment case.
3.

Cases interpreting "reasonableaccommodation"

In PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin,213 a professional golfer asked for an exemption from the rule that players must walk instead of use a golf cart in
certain situations.2 14 The plaintiff in Martin had a degenerative circulatory
disorder that had atrophied his right leg so that he could no longer walk the
208.
See Michelle T. Friedland, Not Disabled Enough: The ADA's "Major Life
Activity" Definition of Disability,52 STAN. L. REv. 171, 173-76 (1999).
209.
42 U.S.C. § 12102(8) (2000).
210.
42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6) (2000).
211.
This is a fairly critical limitation because the employer bears the burden of
justifying his employment policies. The Court seems to indicate that the employer only
bears this burden if the case is classified as a disparate impact case. If, as here, the plaintiff
contends that he was discriminated against because of his disability, and the defendant
contends that he used a neutral employment policy, the burden of persuasion should not
remain on the plaintiff to prove that the policy is a pretext for discrimination, rather the
burden should shift to the defendant to defend the policy.
It should be noted that in Chevron v. Echazabel, 536 U.S. 73 (2002), the Court
did not limit to a charge of disparate impact the defense of proving that the employee posed
a direct threat. For a discussion of this case, see supra text accompanying notes 190-97
What should the plaintiff have done in this case? He could have amended his
complaint, if he had known in time that the defendant was relying on a neutral policy. If he
had relied on alternate theories and his case had been characterized as disparate impact, he
would have lost his right to recover damages, which are available only in disparate treatment
cases. Traveling only under the disparate treatment theory, the plaintiff would have lost if
the employer had shown that the policy was not a pretext for discrimination, even though the
employer is expressly foreclosed by the ADA from having such a policy. On remand, the
lower court decided that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the plaintiff
was discriminated against on the basis of his addiction. Hernandez v. Hughes Missile
Systems Co., 362 F.3d 564, 568-69 (2004).
212.
Chevron, 536 U.S. at 80.
213.
532 U.S. 661 (2001).
214.
Martin, 532 U.S. at 661.
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golf course. 2 15 The defendant contended that exempting the plaintiff from
the rule prohibiting the use of golf carts would fundamentally alter the
nature of the competition.2 16
Title III of the ADA applies to public accommodations and has somewhat different language from Title I that applies to employment. Title III
defines discrimination as, "the failure to make reasonable modifications
unless making such reasonable modifications would fundamentally alter the
nature of the 'goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodation.' ,,217 However, since fundamental alteration is a type of undue
hardship, 1 8 the case has implications for what a reasonable accommodation
without an undue hardship is under Title I, as well.
The Court in Martin said that the use of golf carts is not inconsistent
with the fundamental character of the game, citing their ubiquitous use on
golf courses and the rules of golf followed by most golfers that did not refer
to the use of carts in describing the object of the game.2 1 9 The defendant
contended that "the walking rule was 'outcome determinative' because
fatigue may adversely affect performance.' 220 The Supreme Court did not
agree, but even assuming this was the case, the Court said that the ADA
requires an individual inquiry into whether the accommodation is reasonable in a particular case. 22' Because the plaintiff suffers greater fatigue
than normal, the Court felt that the purpose of the walking rule would not
be compromised.22 2 Thus, the Court held that modifying a "peripheral
rule" would not fundamentally alter the game. 2 3
215.
Id at 667.
216.
Id. at 67O.
217.
Id. at 682.
218.
See Waterstone, supra note 13, at 1841. In Southeastern Community College v.
Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 410 (1979), the Supreme Court said that making a fundamental
alteration is an undue hardship. Also, the EEOC guidance provides that" '[u]ndue hardship'
refers to any accommodation that would be unduly costly, extensive, substantial, or
disruptive, or that would fundamentally alter the nature of the business or operation." 29
C.F.R. 1630.2(p) (2006) (emphasis added).
219.
Martin, 532 U.S. at 683-85.
220.
Id, at 688.
221.
Id.
222.
Id. at 690.
223.
Id.The dissent is interesting:
If one assumes, however, that the PGA TOUR has some legal obligation
to play classic, Platonic golf.... then we as Justices must confront what
is indeed an awesome responsibility .... It has been rendered the solemn duty of the Supreme Court of the United States ... to decide What
is Golf. I am sure that the Framers of the Constitution, aware of the
1457 edict of James II of Scotland prohibiting golf because it interfered
with the practice of archery, fully expected that sooner or later the paths
of golf and government, the law and the links, would once again cross
and that the judges of this august Court would some day have to wrestle
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Having distributed largesse once again in a non-employment case defining Title III's analogue to undue hardship, the Supreme Court proceeded
to interpret the Act narrowly in its first reasonable accommodation/undue
hardship employment case under the ADA. In US Airways, Inc. v.
Barnett,224 the Supreme Court addressed the terms "reasonable accommodation" and "undue hardship" for the first time under the ADA. In Barnett,
the plaintiff's request for an accommodation required overriding the
employer's seniority system. 225 The Court decided that overriding the
seniority system would not be a reasonable accommodation in the usual
case. 22 6 In reaching this decision, the Court provided insight, not only into
the nature of reasonable accommodation, but also into the burden of
proving reasonable accommodation and undue hardship.
With regard to the burden of proving reasonable accommodation and
undue hardship, the Court rejected the plaintiffs argument that he need
only prove that an accommodation is effective.227 The Court said that an
effective accommodation is not necessarily reasonable for the business.22 8
Thus, the employee bears the burden of proving that an accommodation
was reasonable, meaning feasible for the employer in the usual case.229
Once the plaintiff has met this burden, the employer must prove that the
accommodation is an undue hardship in the particular case.23 ° In the
Barnett case, then, the Court said that a violation of the seniority system
would not be a reasonable accommodation in the usual case, so the
employee would have to show special circumstances in order to prevail on
its burden of showing reasonable accommodation. 23'
with that age-old jurisprudential question... : Is someone riding around
a golf course from shot to shot really a golfer? .... Either out of humility or out of self respect (one or the other) the Court should decline to
answer this incredibly difficult or incredibly silly question.
Id. at 700 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
224.
535 U.S. 391 (2002).
225.
Barnett, 535 U.S. at 394.
226. Id. at 398. The Court said that whether collectively bargained or unilaterally
imposed by the employer, seniority systems provide "important employee benefits by
creating, and fulfilling, employee expectations of fair, uniform treatment." The Court said
lastly that the most important consideration was that if the employer were to have to justify
its seniority system in the usual case, that, in itself, would undermine employee expectations.
The Court did leave open the possibility that if the seniority system was not administered in
such a way as to raise employee expectations, then there could be special circumstances in
which a violation of the seniority system would be a reasonable accommodation. Id at 40405.
227.
Barnett, 535 U.S. at 400.
Id.
228.
229.
Id. at 400-02.
230.
Id. at 401-02.
231.
Id. at 406.
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In other words, the employee bears the burden of proving not only that
he is disabled but that he can perform the essential duties of the job with or
without reasonable accommodation, and also that the accommodation is not
unreasonable and not an undue hardship "in the usual case." The employer
bears no burden of proof unless he has to show that the accommodation is
an undue hardship in this particular case.
The net effect of the Court's cases detailed above, in addition to the
restrictive interpretation of reasonable accommodation and legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason, is to limit the protected class to employees who
are almost totally restricted in a major life activity, which has to be
important to the everyday life of most people. Thus, it is difficult to see
who, other than persons who are totally unable to see, hear, or walk, will be
included in the protected class. People with less restricting impairments,
such as alcoholism, are now rarely able to prove that they are disabled.232
IV.

ALCOHOLISM UNDER THE

ADA

Because of the restrictive interpretation of "individual with a disability," few if any alcoholics could be considered to be disabled under the
ADA and consequently would not be entitled to the mildest of accommodations to maintain their sobriety. The alcoholic may be put in the bind of
being unable to maintain his sobriety without time to go to Alcoholics
Anonymous meetings or counseling. If he relapses, he will be fired because
he is not able to measure up to the requirements of the job. Under the
ADA, the question for alcoholics is 1) whether they are disabled; 2)
whether they can perform the essential duties of the job; 3) if so, whether
they are entitled to a reasonable accommodation; and 4) what would be a
reasonable accommodation?
The first problem for purposes of the ADA is, whether an alcoholic,
active or recovering, can ever prove that he is disabled and thus be entitled
to any of the accommodations necessary to secure and maintain his
sobriety? In order to qualify for protection under the ADA, a plaintiff must
prove that he is disabled, that he has an impairment that substantially limits
a major life activity, and that he can perform the essential duties of the job
with or without reasonable accommodation.233
A.

ALCOHOLISM AND DRUG ADDICTION UNDER THE ADA GENERALLY

The first question is whether an alcoholic has an impairment. The
regulations define impairment as a physiological disorder or condition, as
232.
233.

See infra Section IV.B.2.
42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000).
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well as a mental or psychological disorder.234 Alcoholism is considered
235
both a physical and psychological impairment, as discussed above.
Although scientists disagree as to the exact nature of the impairment, all
236
agree that it is an impairment of some kind, as recognized by Congress
and the Rehabilitation Act.237 As noted, the ADA must provide no less
than the protection afforded by the Rehabilitation Act.
In the ADA, Congress distinguished drug addicts from alcoholics and
excluded active drug addicts from the protection of the Act, as well as
employees and applicants who are currently using illegal drugs.2 38
234.
See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. at 632. The regulations referred to were
promulgated by the HEW because this was a public accommodation case, not an
employment case. Id. at 632. The EEOC regulations in this regard are identical. See supra
note 107. The Court in Bragdon quoted the regulations and commented as follows:
A) any physiological disorder or condition, any physiological disorder or
condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or
more of the following body systems: neurological; musculoskeletal; special sense organs; respiratory, including speech organs; cardiovascular;
reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary; hemic and lymphatic; skin; and
endocrine; or
(B) any mental or psychological disorder, such as mental retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning
disabilities. 45 CFR § 84.3(j)(2)(i) (1997).
In issuing these regulations, HEW decided against including a list of
disorders constituting physical or mental impairments, out of concern
that any specific enumeration might not be comprehensive. 42 Fed.Reg.
22685 (1977), reprinted in 45 CFR pt. 84, App. A, p. 334 (1997). The
commentary accompanying the regulations, however, contains a representative list of disorders and conditions constituting physical impairments, including "such diseases and conditions as orthopedic, visual,
speech, and hearing impairments, cerebral palsy, epilepsy, muscular dystrophy, multiple sclerosis, cancer, heart disease, diabetes, mental retardation, emotional illness, and... drug addiction and alcoholism."
Bragdon, at 632-33.
235.
See Hobbs, supra note 29.
236.
Congress included specific provisions in the ADA regarding alcohol and drug
addicts. See supra note 32. From these provisions, it can be seen that Congress was
assuming that alcoholics and drug addicts would be covered and made special provisions for
them, clearly wanting to protect those who were in recovery.
237.
See infra notes 256-57.
238.
See Reese John Henderson, Jr., Addiction as Disability: The Protection of
Alcoholics and Drug Addicts under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 44 VAND. L.
REv. 713 (1991), for a discussion of the origin of the distinction. The definition of disability
excludes one who is currently using illegal drugs.
42 U.S.C. §12114 (2000) provides as follows:
(a) For purposes of this subchapter, the term "qualified individual with a
disability" shall not include any employee or applicant who is currently
engaging in the illegal use of drugs, when the covered entity acts on the
basis of such use.
(b) Rules of construction
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Nothing in subsection (a) of this section shall be construed to exclude as
a qualified individual with a disability an individual who(1) has successfully completed a supervised drug rehabilitation program
and is no longer engaging in the illegal use of drugs, or has otherwise
been rehabilitated successfully and is no longer engaging in such use;
(2) is participating in a supervised rehabilitation program and is no
longer engaging in such use; or
(3) is erroneously regarded as engaging in such use, but is not engaging
in such use; except that it shall not be a violation of this chapter for a
covered entity to adopt or administer reasonable policies or procedures,
including but not limited to drug testing, designed to ensure that an individual described in paragraph (1) or (2) is no longer engaging in the illegal use of drugs.
(c) Authority of covered entity
A covered entity(1) may prohibit the illegal use of drugs and the use of alcohol at the
workplace by all employees;
(2) may require that employees shall not be under the influence of alcohol or be engaging in the illegal use of drugs at the workplace;
(3) may require that employees behave in conformance with the requirements established under the Drug-Free Workplace Act of 1988 (41
U.S.C. 701 et seq.);
(4) may hold an employee who engages in the illegal use of drugs or
who is an alcoholic to the same qualification standards for employment
or job performance and behavior that such entity holds other employees,
even if any unsatisfactory performance or behavior is related to the drug
use or alcoholism of such employee; and
(5) may, with respect to Federal regulations regarding alcohol and the illegal use of drugs, require that(A) employees comply with the standards established in such regulations
of the Department of Defense, if the employees of the covered entity are
employed in an industry subject to such regulations, including complying with regulations (if any) that apply to employment in sensitive positions in such an industry, in the case of employees of the covered entity
who are employed in such positions (as defined in the regulations of the
Department of Defense);
(B) employees comply with the standards established in such regulations
of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, if the employees of the covered
entity are employed in an industry subject to such'regulations, including
complying with regulations (if any) that apply to employment in sensitive positions in such an industry, in the case of employees of the covered entity who are employed in such positions (as defined in the regulations of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission); and
(C) employees comply with the standards established in such regulations
of the Department of Transportation, if the employees of the covered entity are employed in a transportation industry subject to such regulations,
including complying with such regulations (if any) that apply to employment in sensitive positions in such an industry, in the case of employees of the covered entity who are employed in such positions (as defined in the regulations of the Department of Transportation).
(d) Drug testing
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However, the protection of the Act is reinstated if the drug addict has done
the following:
(1) successfully completed a supervised drug rehabilitation
program and is no longer engaging in the illegal use of
drugs, or has otherwise been rehabilitated successfully and
is no longer engaging in such use;
(2) is participating in a supervised rehabilitation program
and is no longer engaging in such use; or
(3) is erroneously regarded as engaging in such use, but is
not engaging in such use.239
The employer may forbid the use of alcohol and drugs on the premises
and impose the same job requirements on alcoholics and drug addicts as
required of other employees, even if unsatisfactory performance is related
to the drug use or alcoholism of such employee. 240 The ADA also allows
(1) In general
For purposes of this subchapter, a test to determine the illegal use of
drugs shall not be considered a medical examination.
(2) Construction
Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to encourage, prohibit, or
authorize the conducting of drug testing for the illegal use of drugs by
job applicants or employees or making employment decisions based on
such test results.
(e) Transportation employees
Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to encourage, prohibit, restrict, or authorize the otherwise lawful exercise by entities subject to the
jurisdiction of the Department of Transportation of authority to-(1) test employees of such entities in, and applicants for, positions involving safety-sensitive duties for the illegal use of drugs and for onduty impairment by alcohol; and
(2) remove such persons who test positive for illegal use of drugs and
on-duty impairment by alcohol pursuant to paragraph (1) from safetysensitive duties in implementing subsection (c) of this section.
239.
42 U.S.C. §12114(b) (2000). The courts are being hard on the addict in this
regard also. For example, in Brown v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 246 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 2001), the
plaintiff was convicted of driving under the influence of intoxicants and required to
participate in a treatment program. Her employer fired her for her absence during the
treatment program. The court said that she was not entitled to the safe harbor provision of
the ADA that extends protection to employees who are participating in a treatment and are
no longer using drugs. Id. at 1189. The court held the provision only applies to employees
who have refrained from using drugs for a significant period of time. Id. at 1186. Thus,
under this interpretation, the safe harbor provision will never apply. See Brown, 246 F.3d
1182.
240.
See generally 42 U.S.C. §12113(a) (2000) (explaining possible defense of
discrimination within the area of job qualifications and standards. This section allows for
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employers to institute drug testing to ensure that a drug addict is no longer
using drugs.24 1
For purposes of this article, I will treat recovering alcoholics and recovering drug addicts the same because both are theoretically protected by
the ADA. As stated previously, the ADA protects active alcoholics, but not
active drug addicts.242
such qualifications that tend to exclude disabled so long as they are shown to be job related
and cannot be accomplished by reasonable accommodation).
241.
The ADA allows drug testing of applicants, which is not considered a medical
examination, an exclusion under the Act. Furthermore, the ADA provides that:
Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to encourage, prohibit, or
authorize the conducting of drug testing for the illegal use of drugs by
job applicants or employees or making employment decisions based on
such test results.

42 U.S.C. § 12114(d)(2) (2000).

There are other provisions regarding compliance with various other federal laws
and regulations. According to § 12114(c)(5) of the ADA, an employer may require that:
(A) employees comply with the standards established in such regulations
of the Department of Defense, if the employees of the covered entity are
employed in an industry subject to such regulations, including complying with regulations (if any) that apply to employment in sensitive positions in such an industry, in the case of employees of the covered entity
who are employed in such positions (as defined in the regulations of the
Department of Defense);
(B) employees comply with the standards established in such regulations
of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, if the employees of the covered
entity are employed in an industry subject to such regulations, including
complying with regulations (if any) that apply to employment in sensitive positions in such an industry, in the case of employees of the covered entity who are employed in such positions (as defined in the regulations of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission); and
(C) employees comply with the standards established in such regulations
of the Department of Transportation, if the employees of the covered entity are employed in a transportation industry subject to such regulations,
including complying with such regulations (if any) that apply to employment in sensitive positions in such an industry, in the case of employees of the covered entity who are employed in such positions (as defined in the regulations of the Department of Transportation).
Furthermore, the Act provides in 42 U.S.C. § 12114(e):
Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to encourage, prohibit, restrict, or authorize the otherwise lawful exercise by entities subject to the
jurisdiction of the Department of Transportation of authority to-(1) test employees of such entities in, and applicants for, positions involving safety-sensitive duties for the illegal use of drugs and for onduty impairment by alcohol; and
(2) remove such persons who test positive for illegal use of drugs and
on-duty impairment by alcohol pursuant to paragraph (1) from safetysensitive duties in implementing subsection (c) of this section.
242.
Illegal drug users face different problems under the ADA. For example, in
Salley v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 160 F.3d 977 (3d Cir. 1998), the plaintiff was fired for
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misconduct relating to his drug use. He was diagnosed a current user of illegal drugs at the
time of his discharge. Id. at 979. While he was in treatment for the drug use, he gave the
company a written statement regarding his drug use. Id. The company fired him when it
learned in the statement that he had used illegal drugs. Id. The court held that the company
could fire him for drug-related conduct, and that his participation in the treatment program
did not protect him because he was an illegal drug user at the time of the misconduct. Id. at
981-82. The court noted that "current user" includes people whose abstinence is longer than
the plaintiffs three weeks. The court cited various cases where the courts found that
plaintiffs were current users in abstinence periods that were longer than the plaintiff's in this
case. Id. at 980 n.2.
In Nielson v. Moroni Feed Co., 162 F.3d 604 (10th Cir. 1998), the plaintiff was
the president of the company and alleged that he was erroneously perceived as being
addicted to legal drugs. Id. at 606-07. He was evaluated at a drug treatment center, where
they determined that he was not a drug addict. Id at 607. The Board of Directors
discharged him for misconduct. Id. The court said that the mere status of being an illegal
drug user may be protected, but the protection is not extended to one currently using drugs.
Id. at 609. If an addict has used drugs in the weeks or months prior to his discharge, he is a
current user and not protected unless he has successfully completed a drug rehabilitation
program and/or is participating in such a program and is no longer using illegal drugs or if
he is erroneously regarded as using illegal drugs. Nielson, 162 F.3d at 609-10. However,
being erroneously regarded as using illegal drugs is only considered a disability if it
substantially limits a major life activity. Id. at 611. The plaintiff failed to produce evidence
of anyone perceiving him as being a drug addict limited in a major life activity. The
plaintiff's contention is that the company thought his alleged drug use was severe enough to
prevent his being able to perform his duties as company president. The court said that this
was insufficient to render him substantially limited in his ability to work because it is only
one job and not a range ofjobs. Id. at 611-12. In any event, it was clear, the court said, that
he was discharged for his misconduct and not because the company thought he was a drug
addict. Id. at 613.
In Zenor v. El Paso HealthcareSystem, Ltd., 176 F.3d 847 (5th Cir. 1999), the
plaintiff pharmacist was fired after he called into work stating that he was high on cocaine,
and after he received treatment for his drug addiction. Id. at 852. First, the court said that
the plaintiff was a current user of illegal drugs because he was informed of the decision to
fire him five weeks after he went into treatment. Id. at 855-857. To support its decision, the
court cited cases that held that six weeks (citing McDaniel v. Baptist Med. Ctr., 877 F. Supp.
321 (S.D. Miss. 1995)) and three weeks (citing Shafer v. Preston Mem'l Hosp. Corp., 107
F.3d 274, 278 (4th Cir. 1997)) amounted to current use. Id. at 856-57. He was not entitled
to the protection of the safe harbor provision because he had not completed a treatment
program and had not been drug-free for a significant period of time. Id. at 857. Furthermore, the court discussed that the hospital may have reasonably believed he was not
qualified to perform his job because his drug addiction would have undermined the integrity
of the hospital pharmacy. Zenor, 176 F.3d at 858. The hospital was entitled to consider the
relapse rate for cocaine users, which is high, in its assessment of whether he was qualified.
Id. at 858. As an alternative ground for its holding, the court explained that he was not
disabled "within the meaning of the ADA." Id. at 859. The plaintiff argued that he was
regarded as a drug addict, and therefore should be considered disabled under the ADA,
specifically § 12102(2)(c), which is the "regarded as" or "perception" category. Id. The
court held that in order to fulfill the "regarded as" or "perception" category, he had to show
that he was perceived that his drug addiction substantially limited a major life activity. The
only available major life activity was working, and he could only show that employer
believed that he could not be a pharmacist. Id. at 860. The court said that a broad range of
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The next question in deciding whether the alcoholic, active or recovering, is disabled is whether his impairment substantially limits him in a
major life activity.243 With regard to the question of whether he has an
impairment, Congress and the lower courts have always assumed thatalcoholism is an impairment, and, until recently, a per se disability. The
Supreme Court has not always been so generous.
B.

CASES ON ALCOHOLISM

1.

Supreme Court cases

The Supreme Court has not dealt with cases under the ADA that involve alcoholism, although it did decide a case involving a drug addict, as
discussed earlier, in which the Court did not reach the issue of drug
addiction. 244 As discussed below, the Court has decided one case involving
alcoholism under the Rehabilitation Act.24 5 Aside from the cases previously mentioned, the Court has decided only one other case involving
alcoholism, and like the other cases, the Court was less than charitable
toward alcoholics and addicts.246
Powell v. Texas, involved whether an alcoholic could be criminally
sanctioned for public drunkenness. 247 The Court opined in this 1968
opinion that an alcoholic was better off in jail than out on the street
intoxicated.
[F]acilities for the attempted treatment of indigent alcoholics are woefully lacking throughout the country. (footnote
omitted) It would be tragic to return large numbers of helpless, sometimes dangerous and frequently unsanitary inejobs was required, not just the inability to perform in his desired field. Id. (citing Deas v.
River West, L.P., 152 F.3d 471 (5th Cir. 1998) (plaintiff could not work as an addiction
technician because of her seizure disorder); Bridges v. City of Bossier, 92 F.3d 329, 335 (5th
Cir. 1996) (plaintiff s hemophilia prevented him from performing as a firefighter).
243.
42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000). See supra note 77 for the full text of this
provision.
244.
As discussed earlier, in Raytheon v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44 (2003), the Court
held that the plaintiff did not show that the employer's supposed reason for refusing to rehire
him, that he had engaged in misconduct, was a pretext. Id. at 53-54. The Court explained
the distinction between disparate treatment and disparate impact claims, and how both are
cognizable under the ADA. The Court held that the lower court improperly applied
disparate impact because petitioner already proved a neutral and legitimate purpose for its
policy. As a result, the Court vacated the lower court's judgment and remanded the case.
245.
See Traynor v. Tumage, 485 U.S. 535 (1988). See infra text accompanying
notes 250-55.
246.
See Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
247.
Id.
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briates to the streets of our cities without even the opportunity to sober up adequately which a brief jail term provides.248
This opinion reflects many of the stereotypes the ADA was designed
to ameliorate. Also, it could be argued that the Court's cabined 1968 view
of alcoholics and the disease of alcoholism might have changed with more
advanced medical understanding of alcoholism as a disease. 249 However,
several years later, in a case decided under the Rehabilitation Act, the
Supreme Court did not treat alcoholism more indulgently.
In Traynor v. Turnage, the question before the Court was whether, in
enacting the Rehabilitation Act, Congress was rejecting the position it had
taken a year earlier under the law relating to veterans, which denominated
primary alcoholism as "willful misconduct" for which the plaintiffs could
lose their benefits. 250 Under the Veterans Administration Act, the V.A.
conclusively presumed that primary alcoholism, as opposed to alcoholism
that is secondary to mental illness, was "willful. ' 25' 1 The plaintiff contended that this conclusive presumption was inconsistent with the Rehabilitation Act's requirement that mandates an individualized inquiry.2 52 The
plaintiffs argued that the V.A., in denying their benefits, was acting based
on "generalized determinations that lack any substantial basis. 25 3 Even
though the Court concluded that it did not have to decide whether alcoholism is a disease beyond the victim's control, the Court quoted the district
court's position on the matter, and then added its own sentiment, citing:
248.
Id.at 528 (citation omitted).
249.
See supra Section II. Commenting on the disease concept of alcoholism, the
Court in Powell noted:
[T]he inescapable fact is that there is no agreement among members of
the medical profession about what it means to say that "alcoholism" is a
"disease." One of the principal works in this field states that the major
difficulty in articulating a "disease concept of alcoholism" is that "alcoholism has too many definitions and disease has practically none"...
This same author concludes that "a disease is what the medicalprofession recognizes as such." . . . In other words, there is widespread agreement today that "alcoholism" is a "disease," for the simple reason that
the medical profession has concluded that it should attempt to treat those
who have drinking problems. There the agreement stops. Debate rages
within the medical profession as to whether "alcoholism" is a separate
"disease" in any meaningful biochemical, physiological or psychological
sense, or whether it represents one peculiar manifestation in some individuals of underlying psychiatric disorders.
Powell, 392 U.S. at 522 (footnotes omitted).
250.
See id.
251.
Id.at 545-47.
252.
Id.at 550.
253.
Id.
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"a substantial body of medical literature that even contests
the proposition that alcoholism is a disease, much less that
it is a disease for which the victim bears no
responsibility. .. ." Indeed, even among many who consider alcoholism a "disease" to which its victims are genetically predisposed, the consumption of alcohol is not regarded as wholly involuntary.254
The Court ultimately concluded that for purposes of veteran's benefits only,
the Rehabilitation Act does not mandate an individualized inquiry of the
factors other than mental illness contributing to primary alcoholism because
Congress and the V.A. have reasonably determined that no such factors
55
exist.

2

Despite the fact that the Supreme Court had taken positions hostile to
alcoholism as a disease for purposes of the criminal law and Veterans'
Administration law, the Court has not rejected alcoholism as a disease
under the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA. Virtually all lower courts
accepted alcoholism as a disability under the Rehabilitation Act.256 The
lower courts' position was carried over into early ADA cases, as well. 57
254.
Id. (citation omitted).
255.
Powell, 485 U.S. at 551.
256.
See, e.g., Duda v. Bd. of Educ., 133 F.3d 1054, 1059 n.10 (7th Cir. 1998) (citing
to various cases that have identified bipolar disorder as well as alcoholism as a disability).
See also Leary v. Dalton, 58 F.3d 748, 752 (1st Cir. 1995) (stating it is "well settled" that
alcoholism is considered a disability under the Rehabilitation Act and citing various cases
that held that alcoholism is a disability under the ADA). See also Maddox v. Univ. of Tenn.,
62 F.3d 843, 846 (6th Cir. 1995) (assuming without deciding that alcoholism is a disability
under the Rehabilitation Act).
257.
In Office of the Senate Sergeant at Arms v. Office of Senate FairEmployment
Practices, 95 F.3d 1102 (Fed. Cir. 1996), the court said "it is well-established that
alcoholism meets the definition of a disability." Id. at 1105.
In Renaud v. Wyoming Departmentof Family Services, 203 F.3d 723 (10th Cir.
2000), the court noted that it had held in previous cases that alcoholism is a disability under
the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act:
Our determination that alcoholism is a disability under the Rehabilitation
Act may be relevant to a determination of whether alcoholism is a disability under the ADA. (citation omitted) "Congress adopted the definition of [the] term ['disability'] from the Rehabilitation Act definition of
the term "individual with handicaps." By so doing, Congress intended
that the relevant caselaw developed under the Rehabilitation Act be generally applicable to the term 'disability' as used in the ADA."...
Id. at 729-30 n.2 (citation omitted).
Several circuits have held that alcoholism is a disability under the ADA.
See, e.g., Mararri v. WCI Steel, Inc., 130 F.3d 1180, 1180 (6th
Cir.1997); Buckley v. Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, 127 F.3d
270, 273 (2d Cir. 1997), vacated en banc on other grounds, 155 F.3d 150
(2d Cir.1998); Miners v. Cargill Communications, Inc., 113 F.3d 820,
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Lower court cases on alcoholism under the ADA

Buckley v. ConsolidatedEdison Co. of New York, 25 8 decided prior to
the Court's unfavorable interpretations of the ADA, discussed above,259
demonstrates how the ADA was supposed to work in the context of
alcoholism. 260 The plaintiff was a recovering alcoholic and drug addict,
who was required to give a urine sample for drug testing. 261 Because he
had a medical condition known as neurogenic bladder, he was unable to
provide the required sample in the time allowed and was fired.262 He
conceded that this condition was not a disability, but argued that his drug
and alcohol addiction was.263 The court agreed.264 Although he could not
show that he was currently substantially limited in a major life activity, the
court found that he had a record of a disability.265
We, moreover, have previously held that "substance abuse
is a 'handicap' for purposes of the Rehabilitation Act," (citation omitted) .... And this is highly relevant since the
ADA states that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this
chapter, nothing in this chapter shall be construed to apply
a lesser standard than the standards applied under title V of
823 n. 5 (8th Cir.1997); Office of the Senate Sergeant at Arms v. Office
of Senate Fair Employment Practices, 95 F.3d 1102, 1105
(Fed.Cir.1996); cf Despears v. Milwaukee County, 63 F.3d 635, 635
(7th Cir.1995) (noting that the parties did not deny that alcoholism is a
disability under the ADA). Whether alcoholism is a disability per se may
raise additional issues. See Burch v. Coca-Cola Co., 119 F.3d 305, 31617 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that alcoholism is not a per se disability under
the ADA and evidence that alcoholics, in general, are impaired is inadequate to show the substantial limitation of one or more major life activities), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1084, 118 S.Ct. 871, 139 L.Ed.2d 768
(1998); see also Wallin v. Minnesota Dep't of Corrections, 153 F.3d
681, 686 n. 4 (8th Cir.1998) (citing Burch and requiring that a plaintiff
show impairment of a major life activity), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1004,
119 S.Ct. 1141, 143 L.Ed.2d 209 (1999); Buckley, 127 F.3d at 274 (citing Burch and requiring the plaintiff to demonstrate both "that he was
actually addicted.., and that this addiction substantially limited one or
more of his major life activities").
Id.at 730 n.3.
258.
127 F.3d 270 (2d Cir. 1997).
259.
See supra Part III.B.
260.
127 F.3d 270 (2d Cir. 1997); see also supra Section III.B. for further discussion
on the court's unfavorable interpretations of alcoholism as a disability under the ADA.
261.
Buckley, 127 F.3d at 272.
262,
Id.
263.
Id.
264.
Id.
265.
Id.at 274.
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the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (citation omitted) or the
regulations issued by Federal agencies pursuant to such title". . . . Furthermore, the legislative history of the ADA
also indicates that the law was intended to apply to recovering addicts. The committee reports state that the term
"physical or mental impairment" includes, inter alia, "drug
266
addiction[ ] and alcoholism.,
The plaintiff also had to prove that his addiction substantially limited
one or more major life activities in the past to prove that he had a record of
a disability. The court did not elaborate but concluded that, having shown
that he had a record of having an addiction, it could be assumed that he had
met this prong.267 The court ultimately decided that the company was
discriminating against recovering addicts who had the plaintiffs bladder
condition because they were required to give a urine sample more
frequently.268 Other people who were not recovering addicts but who had
the same bladder condition were not required to give a urine sample with
such frequency. While it would be an undue hardship for the company to
test the plaintiff less frequently because this would endanger its drug-free
workplace status, the company could easily accommodate the plaintiff by
giving him more time to produce the sample.269
The court's analysis in Buckley illustrates the way the ADA was working, and was supposed to work, in such a case, but after the Supreme
Court's unfavorable spate of decisions interpreting the ADA,27 ° the cases
dealing with alcoholism are almost uniformly holding that the alcoholic
plaintiff was unable to prove that he was disabled. 71
266.

Id.

Buckley, 127 F.3d at 273 (citation omitted). The court went on to say:
The reports also make clear that "[i]n removing protection for persons
who currently use illegal drugs, the Committee does not intend to affect
coverage for individuals who have a past drug problem or are erroneously perceived as having a current drug problem .. "
Finally, the Equal Opportunity Employment Commission's Americans
With Disabilities Act, Title I Technical Assistance Manual ("EEOC
Manual") states that "[p]ersons addicted to drugs, but who are no longer
using drugs illegally and are receiving treatment for drug addiction or
who have been rehabilitated successfully, are protected by the ADA
from discrimination on the basis of past drug addiction."

267.
Id. at 274.
268. Id.
269.
Id. at 275.
270.
See supra Section IV.B.1.
271.
Again, alcoholism is just an example, the ADA does not function as it should
with regard to many impairments previously considered to be per se disabilities. See, e.g.,
cases cited supranote 312; Olsky, supra note 34.
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Although a plaintiff has three ways of claiming protection under the
ADA, the alcoholic plaintiff is currently succeeding in none of these
possibilities. As discussed below, to be a member of the protected class,
the plaintiff must prove that he has an impairment that substantially limits a
major life activity or that he was regarded by the employer as having such
an impairment or that he has a record of such an impairment.27 2
a.

Whether the plaintiffis in the protectedclass

1) Whether the plaintiffhas an impairmentthat substantially
limits a major life activity
After Sutton, the courts no longer hold that alcoholism is a per se dis-

ability. 27 3 The trend toward determining that alcoholism is not a disability,

however, began prior to the Sutton case, as some courts began to restric-

tively interpret the meaning of disability. 274 In a pre-Sutton case, Burch276
v.
Coca Cola Co., 275 the court said that alcoholism is not a per se disability

and required the plaintiff to show that his alcoholism significantly limited a
major life activity.2 77 The plaintiff said that drinking affected his ability to
sleep, think, walk and talk.278 The court said that his inability to perform
these functions was temporary and no different from anyone who overindulges in alcohol. 279 Although his alcoholism was permanent, the effects
he referred to were not. The court said that the plaintiff produced no
evidence of permanent alteration of gait, ability to speak properly, longterm insomnia or memory impairment when sober.280 He admitted that his
work was not affected and that he never drank during working hours.28'
After Sutton, virtually all courts now generally find that alcoholics are
not significantly limited in any major life activity under the Supreme

272. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000).
273.
See, e.g., Nelson v. Williams Field Servs. Co., 2000 WL 743684 (10th Cir. June
9, 2000) (noting that plaintiff's counsel conceded that alcoholism is not a per se disability
under the ADA).

274.
See Catherine J. Lanctot, Ad Hoc Decision Making and Per Se Prejudice: How
Individualizingthe Determinationof 'Disability' Undermines the ADA, 42 VILL. L. REv. 327

(1997) (asserting that courts have generally rejected the concept of per se disability with
respect to many life threatening diseases).
275.

276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.

119 F.3d 305 (5th Cir. 1997).

Id. at 315.
Id. at 305.
Id.
Id.
Id.

Burch, 119 F.3d at 316 n.9.
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Court's restrictive interpretation of that term.282 Alcoholics, especially
those in recovery, have difficulty identifying a major life activity in which
they are currently significantly limited. The most likely major life activity
in which alcoholics may claim to be limited in performing is working,
which carries its own baggage, as discussed above.283
The EEOC defines a major life activity as "functions such as caring
for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking,
breathing, learning, and working. ''2M The regulations indicate that the list
is not exhaustive,2 85 and that generally "major life activities" are those basic
activities that the average person in the general population can perform with
little or no difficulty. 286 A person is "substantially limited in a major life
activity if he is unable to perform or is 'significantly restricted as ... to the
condition, manner, or duration under which the average person in the
general population can perform' that activity. 287
Bailey v. Georgia-PacificCorp.,288 is a good example of the difficulty
of proving that alcoholism is a disability. In the Bailey case, the plaintiff
was an active alcoholic whose attempts at recovery had been unsuccessful. 289 Despite this fact, he had generally been able to fulfill his job
duties. 290 The plaintiff was eventually jailed for driving under the influence
and asked the defendant to allow him to work on a work-release program. 29' The plaintiff contended that he was entitled to this as a reasonable
accommodation. The defendant declined and terminated the plaintiff for
excessive leave.292
The court decided that the plaintiff was not disabled, even though
there is no question but that alcoholism is "an impairment" under the ADA.
However, the court said that, although alcoholism is not excluded from the
ADA, it is treated differently, noting the requirement that alcoholics be held
282.
See, e.g., Nauseda v. Tootsie Roll Indus., Inc., 2003 WL 1873519 (N.D. I11.
2003 April 15, 2003) (holding that the plaintiff was not substantially limited in such major
life activities as sleeping and communicating).
283.
See supra text accompanying notes 138-143.
284.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(2)(i) (2006).
285.
Indeed the Supreme Court has indicated such, in its determination that
reproduction is a major life activity. See Bryan P. Stephenson, I'm So Lonesome I Could
Cry.... But Could I Sue? Whether Interactingwith Others Is a MajorLife Activity Under the
ADA, 31 PEPP. L. REv. 773 (2004), for a discussion of various life activities the courts have
held to be major or not.
286.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(2)(i) (2006).
287.
Id.
288.
306 F.3d 1162 (1st Cir. 2002).
289.
Id. at 1164.
290.
Id
291.
Id.at 1165.
292.
See id. at 1165 (inferring that plaintiff claimed an entitlement to the workrelease program).
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to the same standards as other employees and that they can be required to
not be under the influence at work.293 The court said that generally
alcoholism is not recognized as a per se disability under the Act so that the
plaintiff must make an individualized showing.294
The plaintiff contended that he was substantially limited in working,
but the court said that he did not show that he was unable to perform a
broad range of jobs. To prove that he was substantially limited in working,
he would have had to have shown that he could not "perform either a class
of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the
average person having comparable training, skills and abilities., 295 The
court noted that the Supreme Court's decision in Sutton v. United Air
Lines, 296 cast doubt on whether working should be considered a major life
activity.297 The court said that proof that one is so limited must relate to the
relevant geographic area; the numbers and types of jobs in the area from
which the plaintiff is foreclosed; and the types of training, skills and
abilities the jobs require. 298Thpli
The plaintiff showed only that he had difficulty
performing his job, and even that showing was weak because he was
usually able to perform. The fact that he was incarcerated and unable to
perform was short term and not a substantial limitation. 99
Similarly, in Boerst v. General Mills Operations,Inc.,3 °° the plaintiff,
a recovering alcoholic, suffered from anxiety, fatigue, difficulty sleeping,
and an inability to concentrate. 30 ' The court held that he was not disabled.
The court said that sleeping and working are major life activities, but that
concentrating and maintaining stamina are not.30 2 The court said that he
had to show that either he could not perform a major life activity which an
average person could perform or that his performance was significantly
restricted.30 3 The court opined that the inability to work more than eight
293.

Bailey, 306 F. 3d at 1167 n.4.

295.
296.
297.

Id. at 1168 (quoting EEOC guidelines).
527 U.S. 471 (1999).
Bailey, 306 F.3d at 1168 n.5.
Id. at 1168 (citing the EEOC guidelines,

294.

Id. at 1167-68.

298.
1630.20)(3)(1)).

specifically,

29 C.F.R. §

299.
Id. at 1168-69.
300.
25 F.App'x. 403 (6th Cir. 2002).
301.
Id. The plaintiff was concerned that all this would cause him to relapse into
active alcoholism. Id. at 404. His doctor recommended that he be excused from overtime
and allowed to work no more than eight hours a day. Id.at 405. When the employer
required that he work more than eight hours a day, he filed a complaint. Id
302.
Id. at 406.
303.
Boerst, 25 F.App'x. at 407. He was unable to show that he was substantially
limited in working because he did not make this showing with regard to a broad range of
jobs. Id. Finally, he testified that taking an antidepressant had pretty much solved his
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hours a day was not enough to show disability, nor did this show that he
could not perform a wide range of jobs. With regard to sleeping, the
plaintiff showed that he slept only from two to four hours a night. The
court said that this was not sufficient to show that he was substantially
limited in his ability to sleep. 3 °4
McKay v. Town and Country Cadillac, Inc., 30 5 illustrates another
plaintiff's unsuccessful attempt to identify a substantial limitation in a
major life activity.3 °6 The plaintiff argued that he had produced substantial
evidence that his alcoholism had a devastating effect on his family relations
and social life.30 7 Never again could he go to any social event where
alcohol was being served.30 8 This limited his ability to develop social
relationships.309 The court accepted that the ability to interact with others
does constitute a major life activity, although other courts have held that it
does not. 310 However, the court said that the plaintiff was not substantially
limited in his ability to interact with others in any event just because he
could not attend social events where alcohol is served. The court said that a
mere alteration in lifestyle does not constitute a substantial limitation. The
question was whether the plaintiff was "significantly restricted as to the
condition, manner, or duration under which he performed family or social
functions as compared to the condition, manner or duration under which the
average person
in the general population can perform family or social
31
functioning., 1
problems, so since mitigating measures must be considered in determining whether one is
disabled, he was not. Id.
304.
Id.
305.
2002 WL 1285065 (N.D. Ill. June 7, 2002).
306.
Id.
307.
Id.at *4.
308.
Id.
309.
Id.
310.
Id.at *4 (citing Solieau v. Guilford of Me., Inc., 958 F. Supp. 37 (D. Me. 1996);
cf Rowles v. Automated Production Systems, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 424 (M.D. Pa. 2000)
(describing a situation in which life style changes were sufficient to be substantially
limiting).
311.
McKay, 2002 WL 1285065, at *4. The plaintiff also contended that the court
ignored evidence that it said was not presented that his recovery support groups required his
absence from his family for 4-5 hours a day in early recovery. Id.at *8. Added to his work
requirement, this left no time for his family. Id.He also alleged that he had no time to form
friendships. Id.The plaintiff also alleged substantial limitation in ability to care for himself
because he has to limit his intake of food to food that does not contain alcohol. Id.at * 11.
He also contended that he was substantially limited in his ability to reproduce for fear of
passing on the disease. Id.at * 13. Even if there were a genetic link which the plaintiff did
not prove, the plaintiff did not present sufficient evidence that he is not substantially limited
in reproduction. Id. The plaintiff had two children born after he established his pattern of
alcohol abuse. However, the court made note that the fact that he had children did not
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Alcoholic plaintiffs, indeed most plaintiffs, have been unsuccessful in
proving that they are disabled because they are unable to prove that they are
sufficiently limited in a major life activity.312 The usual problem with
alcoholics is that even in recovery, they may be perceived by employers as
unable to perform. Thus, the plaintiff should be able to proceed under the
second prong of the ADA, that the plaintiff was "regarded as" disabled.
Again, the restrictive interpretation of "significantly limited in a major life
activity" virtually eliminates this possibility also.
2)

Whether the plaintiff was regardedas disabled

One of the principal concerns of the ADA was discrimination based on
myths and stereotypes surrounding disabilities. For this reason, Congress
prohibited discrimination against persons who are regarded as disabled,
trigger the court to decide that the plaintiff was not substantially limited merely because
reproduction is based on personal choice. Id. at * 15.
312.
Since the Court's restrictive interpretation of disability, all plaintiffs have had
problems proving that they were substantially limited in a major life activity. For example,
in Waldrip v. Gen. Elec. Co., 325 F.3d 652 (5th Cir. 2003), the plaintiff had chronic
pancreatitis and was allegedly fired when his employer saw the warning on his medication
that he should not work around heavy machinery when taking it. Id. at 654. The court said
that he did not prove he was disabled. Id. at 655-57. The plaintiff said that the disorder,
which can cause bleeding, tissue death and even pancreatic cancer, substantially limits his
ability to eat and digest. Id. at 655. The court was willing to concede that eating is a major
life activity but that the plaintiff did not produce evidence that he was substantially limited
in his ability to eat. Id. at 654-55. The court then cited other similar cases in which it had
found that the plaintiff was not substantially limited in a major life activity. Waldrip, 652
F.3d at 654-55.
The court cited cases in which plaintiffs were not substantially limited in their
ability to work because their cancer and its treatment did not limit the ability to work. In
addition, the court cited the following cases in which serious impairments were not
substantially limiting:
Blanks v. Southwestern Bell Communications, Inc., 310 F.3d 398, 401
(5th Cir.2002) (holding HIV not a substantial limit on major life activity
of reproduction); Dupre v. Charter Behavioral Health Sys., Inc., 242
F.3d 610, 614 (5th Cir.2001) (holding back injury not a substantial limit
on major life activities of sitting, standing, or working); Talk [v. Delta
Airlines, 165 F.3d 1021 (5th Cir. 1999] 165 F.3d at 1025 (holding deformed leg not a substantial limit on major life activities of walking or
working); Still [v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 120 F.3d 50 (5th Cir.1997)]
120 F.3d at 52 (holding monocular vision not a substantial limit on major life activity of working); Robinson v. Global Marine Drilling Co.,
101 F.3d 35, 37 (5th Cir.1996) (holding asbestosis not a substantial limit
on major life activity of breathing); Dutcher [v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, 53
F.3d 723 (5th Cir. 1995)] (holding permanent arm injury not a substantial limit on major life activity of working).
Id. at 656 n.5. It is little wonder that defendants are currently winning 90% of the
cases. Colker, Winning, supra note 5, at 240.
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even if they are not.31 3 The Supreme Court in Sutton recognized only two
possibilities for the plaintiff who is trying to prove that he was regarded as
disabled: Either the employee has an impairment that is not substantially
limiting, or the employee has no impairment at all.314 The Court said that,
in either situation, the employer must believe that the impairment is
substantially limiting in a major life activity.31 5 There is a third possibility
cited in the regulations 31 6 that the Court did not cite, and that is that the
plaintiff is substantially limited in a major life activity because of the
attitude of others towards his impairment.317 This regulation was included
among those that interpret the Rehabilitation Act, which were validated for
purposes of the ADA.3 18
Although the language of the statute applies the substantial limitation
of a major life activity to all three prongs, 319 the "regarded as" prong should
focus primarily on how the plaintiff is treated and not on the nature of the
substantial limitation. 320 As noted, however, most courts require the
plaintiff to prove not just that the employer acted based on stereotypes or
misconceptions, but also acted on the belief that the plaintiff is substantially
limited in a major life activity. 32'
Consequently, as under the actual disability prong of the disability
definition, plaintiffs proceeding under the "regarded as" prong are also
being stymied by the requirement that they must be perceived as substantially limited in a major life activity. For example, in Bailey v. GeorgiaPacific Corp.,322 after the court rejected the plaintiffs contention that he
was actually disabled, as discussed above,32 3 the plaintiff argued that he
should be considered disabled under the alternative provisions of the
ADA.324 Concerning whether he was regarded as disabled, the court noted
See Mayerson, supra note 48, at 592; 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000). See Thomas
313.
Simmons, "Working" With the ADA 's "Regardedas " Definition of a Disability, 5 TEX. F.
ON C.L. & C.R. 27 (2000), for a discussion of the origin and interpretation of the "regarded
as" prong.
See Sutton v. United Airlines, 527 U.S. 471,482 (1999) (holding that correction
314.
or mitigation of an impairment disqualifies a person f'om claiming that s/he is substantially
limited in a major life activity).
315.
Sutton, 527 U.S. at 489.
316.
The EEOC took these regulations directly from the regulations issued by HEW
under the Rehabilitation Act. See Burgdorf, supra note 15, at 434-35. The Supreme Court
has recognized the authority of the regulations issued by HEW. Id.
See Mayerson, supra note 48, at 591-92; Simmons, supra note 313, at 75-76.
317.
318.
Id.
319.
See Eichhom, Mitigating, supranote 153, at 1432-33.
See Burgdorf, supra note 15, at 435.
320.
See Mayerson, supra note 48, at 591.
321.
306 F.3d 1162 (1st Cir. 2002).
322.
See supra text accompanying notes 288-99.
323.
324.
Bailey, 306 F.3d at 1169.
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that the Supreme Court had provided that there were two ways of being
regarded as disabled. 32' The plaintiff was not considered disabled under
either of these ways because under the major life activity of working, the
employer did not believe he was disabled in performing anything but his
own specific job.326
Logically an employer's central concern is with an employee's ability
to perform his specific job. If the test is the individual employer's
perception, most employers would not be concerned with whether the
employee could not care for himself or anything else. Thus, the "regarded
as" avenue into the protected class would never function. In fact, one court
has opined that requiring that the employer believe that the employee
cannot perform a broad range of jobs has virtually eliminated the "regarded
as" claim for the major life activity of working.327
Nielson v. Moroni Feed Co. 328 is a good example. The plaintiff was
the president of the company and was ousted for misconduct. He alleged
that he was erroneously perceived as being addicted to drugs. 3 29 However,
325.
Id.(citing Sutton, 527 U.S. at 489). See supratext accompanying note 135.
326.
Bailey, 306 F.3d at 1169. Similarly, in Burch v. Coca Cola Co., 119 F.3d 305,
322 (1997), the plaintiff's argued in the alternative that he was regarded as disabled.
The court said:
One is regarded as having a substantially limiting impairment if the individual (1) has an impairment which is not substantially limiting but
which the employer perceives as constituting a substantially limiting impairment; (2) has an impairment which is substantially limiting only because of the attitudes of others toward such an impairment; or (3) has no
impairment at all but is regarded by the employer as having a substantially limiting impairment.
Id. at 322 (citing Bridges v. City of Bossier, 92 F.3d 329, 332 (5th Cir. 1996)).
There was no other evidence that the employer regarded him as substantially
limited in a broad range of jobs, as required. Id. While the employer may have been
concerned about his inappropriate behavior, there was no evidence that this was regarded as
substantially limiting. Id. In addition, there was no evidence that the employer discredited
letters from his doctors showing that he would be able to refrain from such behavior. Id.
However, even if the employer regarded his alcoholism as an impediment, there was no
showing that the employer regarded him as significantly limited in his ability to perform an
entire class of jobs, just his job as an area service manager with responsibility for 20
employees. Id at 323.
327.
Sullivan v. Neiman Marcus Group Inc., 358 F.3d 110, 118 n.4 (1st Cir. 2004)
(referencing Claudia Center & Andrew J. Imparato, Redefining "Disability"Discrimination:
A Proposalto Restore Civil Rights Protectionsfor All Workers, 14 Stan. L. & Pol'y Rev.
321, 328 (2003); Miranda Oshige McGowan, Reconsideringthe Americans with Disabilities
Act, 35 Ga. L. Rev. 27, 123 (2000)).
328.
162 F.3d 604 (10th Cir. 1998).
329.
Id. at 606. The Board of Directors told him that they thought he had a drug
problem and that he was going into homes to steal drugs. Id. He was evaluated and was
determined to be a drug addict. Id. The Board discharged him for trespassing into private
homes. Id.
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the court said that being erroneously regarded as using drugs illegally is
considered a disability only if the plaintiff is perceived to be sufficiently
impaired to substantially limit a major life activity. 330 The plaintiff failed
to produce evidence of anyone perceiving him as being limited in a major
life activity. 331 The plaintiffs contention was that the company believed
his alleged drug use was severe enough that it prevented him from
performing his duties as company president. The court said that this was
insufficient to render him substantially limited in his ability to work
because it is only one job and not a range of jobs.33 2 The court said the
plaintiff must also show that the employer regarded him as unable to
perform in a broad range of jobs, not just the job he held.333
The Supreme Court in Sutton cited with approval the EEOC's definition of the major life activity of working as requiring that the employee
could not do a broad range of jobs, 334 even though the Court was skeptical
about working being considered a major life activity. 335 What the Court
failed to note was that the EEOC had indicated in its guidance that the
evidence needed to prove substantial limitation in working should not be
330.
Id. at 611.
331.
Id.
332.
Id. at 611-12 (holding that he was not discharged because of his perceived
addiction, but because of his unexplained trespass into peoples' houses).
333.
Id.
334.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.20)(3)(i) (2000), which provides that:
(3) With respect to the major life activity of working(i) The term substantially limits means significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various
classes as compared to the average person having comparable training,
skills and abilities.
The inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a
substantial limitation in the major life activity of working:
(ii) In addition to the factors listed in paragraph 0)(2) of this section, the
following factors may be considered in determining whether an individual is substantially limited in the major life activity of "working":
(A) The geographical area to which the individual has reasonable access;
(B) The job from which the individual has been disqualified because
of an impairment, and the number and types of jobs utilizing similar
training, knowledge, skills or abilities, within that geographical area,
from which the individual is also disqualified because of the impairment (class of jobs); and/or
(C) The job from which the individual has been disqualified because
of an impairment, and the number and types of other jobs not utilizing
similar training, knowledge, skills or abilities, within that geographical
area, from which the individual is also disqualified because of that impairment (broad range of jobs in various classes).
335.
Sutton, 527 U.S. at 473.
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onerous. 336 In addition, the guidance provides that one rejected from a job
because of "myths, fears, and stereotypes" would be covered by this prong
regardless of whether or not others shared this view. 3 3 7 Clearly, the
employer's belief of whether the employee was able to perform a wide
range of jobs would be less relevant under the EEOC's guidance.
Shiplett v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp.338 is an example of how "regarded as" should work. The plaintiff had been prescribed a highly
addictive prescription drug for a sleep disorder. 339 The plaintiff contended
that the employer regarded him as disabled. 340 The court said that the
plaintiff had not specified what major life activities the defendant regarded
the plaintiff as substantially limited in performing, so it assumed that the
defendant regarded the plaintiff as substantially limited in performing his
job as a train engineer.341 The court said that several circuits held the
employer does not necessarily perceive the employee as being disabled
simply because he cannot perform a particular job.34 2 The court decided
that a broad range of jobs was involved in this case; however, if the
then
defendant perceived the plaintiff as unable to perform the engineer job,
343
he would be unable to perform a wide range of safety sensitive jobs.
Some courts interpret "broad range of jobs" to even require the plaintiff to seek work outside his profession. For example, in Zenor v. El Paso
-HealthcareSys., Ltd., the plaintiff pharmacist was fired after he went into
treatment for drug addiction. The plaintiff argued that he was regarded as a
drug addict. 344 The only feasible major life activity in which he could
argue he was substantially limited was working, and he could only show

See Burgdorf, supra note 15, at 454 (citing Equal Employment Opportunities
336.
for Individuals with Disabilities, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,728 (July 26, 1991).
337.
Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. A, § 1630.2 (j) (2000)); see supra text
accompanying notes 316-18.
338.
No. 97-2056, 1999 WL 435169 (6th Cir. June 17, 1999).
Id. at * 1.
339.
340.
Id. at *7.
341.
Id.
342.
Id. at *8 (citing Byrne v. Bd. of Educ., Sch. of W. Allis-W. Milwaukee, 979
F.2d 560, 567 (7th Cir. 1992)).
343.
Shiplett, 1999 WL 435169, at *8 (holding that the plaintiff was a direct threat to
safety and thus unqualified). See also Avery v. Omaha Pub. Power Dist., No. 98-1739, 1999
WL 555299 (8th Cir. July 27, 1999) (stating that after Sutton, to prove that he is regarded as
disabled, the plaintiff must show more than that the employer regarded him as an alcoholic
and a security risk so that he could not do a range of security sensitive jobs).
176 F.3d 847, 859 (5th Cir. 1999). See also Overstreet v. Calvert County
344.
Health Dep't., 187 F.Supp.2d 567, 572-73 (D. Md. 2002) (finding that the defendant argued
that being an addiction counselor is not a broad enough range of jobs to qualify the plaintiff
as regarded as disabled. The court did not reach this issue because it held that the plaintiff
was not constructively discharged).
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that his employer believed that he could not be a pharmacist. 345 The court
said that a broad range of jobs was required, not just the inability to perform
in his desired field.346

Unless the courts are willing to interpret the term "substantially limited in a major life activity" more generously, that leaves only the last
possibility for claiming protection, "having a record of a disability. 34 7
Even here, the same problem arises; the plaintiff cannot prove that he has a
record of being substantially limited in a major life activity.
3)

Whether the plaintiffhas a record of having a disability

The intent of the "having a record of a disability" prong was to protect
one from discrimination who has a history of a disability or who has been
misclassified as disabled.3 48 This should be an easier route for alcoholics,
who usually have a record of a disability. However, because having a
record of a disability is not defined in the Act, and the Court has not
clarified its meaning under the ADA, the EEOC regulations and guidances,
along with caselaw, must be referenced. The EEOC provides that "having a
record of' can mean a history of disability or it can mean an actual
documented record, such as medical, educational or employment records.34 9
Again, the plaintiff has to prove that he has a record of a substantially
limiting impairment. Because the Court requires such stringent proof that
the plaintiff is substantially limited in a major life activity, plaintiffs are
having difficulty proving this prong as well.
In Bailey v. Georgia-PacificCorp.,350 for example, the court said, with
regard to the recovering alcoholic plaintiff, that "having a record of a
disability" is supposed to protect those who have recovered or are
recovering from substantially limiting impairments from discrimination
based on their medical history. Although the plaintiff had a record of an
impairment, the court found that he could not show that he had a record of
an impairment
that substantially limited him in a major life activity, such as
51
working.1
345.
Zenor, 176 F.3d at 860.
346.
Id. at 860 (citing Deas v. River W., L.P., 152 F.3d 471, 481 (5th Cir. 1998)
(discussing how plaintiff could not work specifically as an Addiction Technician because of
her seizure disorder); Bridges v. City of Bossier, 92 F.3d 329, 335 (5th Cir. 1998) (finding
that plaintiff's hemophilia prevented him from performing as a firefighter).
347.
42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000).
348.
Justin S. Gilbert, Prior History, Present Discrimination, and the ADA's
"Record of' Disability, 31 U. MEM. L. REv. 659, 661 (2001) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k)

(2000)).

349.
350.

351.

Id. at 661-62.
306 F.3d 1162 (1st Cir. 2002).

Id. at 1169.
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In a case decided prior to Sutton, Burch v. Coca Cola Co., the court
said the fact that the alcoholic plaintiff had been hospitalized would be
considered in whether he had a record of a disability, but that the hospital
stay was of insufficient duration to qualify the plaintiff as having a record
of a disability. 35 2 This decision is contrary to the Supreme Court's decision
in School Bd of Nassau County v. Arline, in which the Court held that the
353
plaintiff had a record of a disability because she had been hospitalized.
decided under the Rehabilitation Act and is precedent for the
Arline was
4
ADA.

35

Even if the plaintiff could show he was substantially limited in a major
life activity, he still has the additional obstacle of whether he could perform
the essential duties of the job.
4) Whether the plaintiff is unable to perform the essential
functions of thejob and the conflict with the major life activity of
working
Title I, which applies to employment, poses additional problems for
plaintiffs. Title I requires, in addition to being disabled, that one still be
able to perform the essential duties of the job.355 As discussed above,
because of the stringent requirements the Court has imposed on proving a
person is disabled, Title I effectively protects very few people. The courts
require that the plaintiff be so impaired it is unlikely that he can perform the
essential duties of the job.356
As the court said in one case, it was "assuming without deciding" that
working is a major life activity because of the conceptual difficulties of the
analysis. 5 The problem, the court said, is that to prove he is disabled, the
plaintiff must prove he is substantially limited in his ability to work;
however, once the plaintiff shows that his ability to work is substantially
limited, then he probably cannot prove that he is qualified for the job.3 58 In
other words, in order to prove he is qualified for the job, the plaintiff has to
prove his alcoholism does not interfere with his job, which then contradicts
his being substantially limited in the major life activity of working, the
most likely major life activity the alcoholic plaintiff can claim to be
substantially limited in performing.

352.
353.
354.
355.
356.
357.
358.

119 F.3d 305, 317 (5th Cir. 1997).
480 U.S. 273, 281 (1987).
See Burgdorf, supra note 15, and accompanying text.
42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2000).
See Section IV.B.2.a. 1).
Sullivan v. Neiman Marcus Group, 358 F.3d 110 (1st Cir. 2004).
358 F.3d at 115.
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Even if plaintiffs can prove that they are substantially limited in a major life activity other than working, courts often find that the plaintiff could
not perform the essential functions of the job.359 Several courts have said
that showing up to work as scheduled is an essential function of the job, for
example.36 ° In one case, because the plaintiff was in jail for driving while
intoxicated, he could not show up for work. 36 1 He was terminated for
excessive unauthorized absences, which is allowed by the ADA's requirement that the employee measure up to the employer's standards. 362 Thus,
an alcoholic employee has an even more difficult proof problem because he
can be held to the same performance standards as other employees. 363 If he
is unable to perform his job because of his disability, he can be discharged
for failing to meet the employer's performance standards.3 6 Because of
this provision, most courts effectively relieve the employer of its obligation
to reasonably accommodate.3 65
Alcoholic plaintiffs often engage in unacceptable behavior, which can
serve as the impetus for getting them into treatment.366 Because employers
are not required to reasonably accommodate such behavior, the alcoholic
plaintiff can be fired without providing him the generally accepted
reasonable accommodation of leave to receive treatment.36 7
b. Dischargefor reasons relatedto disability and holdingplaintiffto
same standards
1)

Bad conduct

Although alcoholic plaintiffs' unacceptable behavior is usually related
to their illness, the courts disconnect the behavior from the illness and
attribute the employers' action to the behavior and not to the plaintiffs'
359.
See, e.g., Altman v. N.Y. City Health and Hosp. Corp., 100 F.3d 1054, 1060 (2d
Cir. 1996) (holding that the plaintiff was not qualified to serve as Chief of Medicine because
of his inability to stay sober and his conduct that endangered patients and the hospital when
he was drinking).
360.
See, e.g., Smith v. Davis, 248 F.3d 249, 251 (3d Cir. 2001) (explaining that an
employee who does not come to work on a regular basis is "not qualified" even if caused by
his alcoholism, and the employer is not required to accommodate his excessive absenteeism); Leary v. Dalton, 58 F.3d 748 (1st Cir. 1995).
361.
Leary v. Dalton, 58 F.3d 748, 753 (1st Cir. 1995).
362.
Id. at 753.
363.
42 U.S.C. § 12114(c) (2000). See supra note 32 for text of section.
364.
See, e.g., Sullivan v. Neiman Marcus Group, 358 F.3d 110, 115-16 (1st Cir.
2004) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12114 (c) (2000)).
365.
See, e.g., Leary, 58 F.3d at 753.
366.
See ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOuS supranote 1, at 140-145.
367.
See Office of the Senate Sergeant at Arms v. Office of Senate Fair Employment
Practices, 95 F.3d 1102, 1107 (Fed.Cir. 1996).
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alcoholism. 368 Early ADA and Rehabilitation Act cases, such as Teahan v.
Metro-N. Commuter R.R. Co., 369 generally held that discharge for misconduct caused by the plaintiffs alcoholism was based on a factor closely
related to the plaintiff's disability, so that firing him for the misconduct was
the equivalent of firing him for his disability. The court said it is like a
plaintiff whose limp causes him to make a thump when he walks, and the
employer firing him for making the thumping noise.3 7 °
Subsequent cases, such as Maddox v. University of Tennesee, 371 took a
different view. In the Maddox case, the court approved the firing of a
football coach for driving while intoxicated, which the plaintiff alleged was
causally connected to his alcoholism. 372 The Sixth Circuit held that there is
a distinction between discharging someone for misconduct and discharging
someone for his disability.373 Otherwise the employer would have to
accommodate the plaintiffs behavior, considered unacceptable in other
employees, because of the plaintiffs disability.
By 2001, the courts were virtually unanimous in allowing employers
to fire alcoholic employees for misconduct, even if related to the employee's disability.3 74 These decisions ignore the holding in School Bd of
368.
See, e.g., Renaud v. Wyo. Dep't. of Family Servs., 203 F.3d 723, 729-30 (10th
Cir. 2000) (finding that alcoholism is a disability under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act,
but firing for misconduct is not firing for disability).
369.
951 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1991)
370.
Id. at 516.
371.
62 F.3d 843 (6th Cir. 1995).
Id. at 846-47.
372.
Id. at 847.
373.
374.
See, e.g., Pernice v. City of Chi., 237 F.3d 783, 785 (7th Cir. 2001) (citing the
virtual unanimity of the circuits on the issue that employers are allowed to fire employees
for misconduct, even if it is related to their disability.); Bekker v. Humana Health Plan, Inc.,
229 F.3d 662, 670 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that defendant fired plaintiff not because it
perceived her as an alcoholic but because she was under the influence of alcohol on the job,
for which any employee would be fired); Adamczyk v. Chief of Police of Balt. County, No.
97-1240, 1998 WL 33694 (4th Cir. Jan. 30, 1998) (explaining that plaintiff could be fired for
egregious conduct, even if related to alcoholism); Nielson v. Moroni Feed Co., 162 F.3d
604, 606 (10th Cir. 1998) (discussing why plaintiff company president was ousted for
misconduct). The Board of Directors told him that they thought he had a drug problem and
that he was going into homes to steal drugs. He was evaluated and was determined to be a
drug addict. The Board discharged him for trespassing into private homes. Id.; Burch v.
Coca Cola Co., 119 F.3d 305, 319 n.14 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing a number of other cases in
which firing for misconduct is not firing for alcoholism); Walker v. Consol. Biscuit Co., No.
96-3747, 1997 WL 359054 (6th Cir. June 26, 1997) (explaining employee fired for being
under the influence of alcohol at work, not because he was an alcoholic); Williams v.
Widnall, 79 F.3d 1003, 1006-07 (10th Cir. 1996) (discussing employee fired for making
threats against other employees while in treatment for alcoholism); Leary v. Dalton, 58 F.3d
748, 754 (1st Cir. 1995) (finding that alcoholism is a disability under the Rehabilitation Act,
but that the plaintiff could not perform the essential functions of the job). One of the
functions of the job was showing up to work as scheduled. Because the plaintiff was in jail
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Nassau County v. Arline, in which the Supreme Court said that it is
impermissible 5to distinguish between the effects of a disease and the
37
disease itself.
Nevertheless, because the ADA requires alcoholics and drug addicts to
meet the same performance standards as other employees, the effects of the
disease can be taken into account when deciding to terminate employment
if the employee is unable to measure up to the employer's standards. 376 In
Nielson v. Moroni Feed Co., 3 77 the court said
One area, however, where the ADA and the Rehabilitation
Act (footnote omitted) recognize a dichotomy between a
disability and disability-caused misconduct is where the
disability is related to alcoholism or illegal drug use. (citations omitted) ....
The reason this dichotomy exists in the context of alcoholism and illegal drug use is simple: both the ADA and the
Rehabilitation Act clearly contemplate removing from
statutory protection unsatisfactory conduct caused by alcoholism and illegal drug use. Specifically, the ADA states
that a covered entity may hold an employee who engages in
the illegal use of drugs or who is an alcoholic to the same
qualification standards for employment or job performance
and behavior that such entity hold other employees, even if
any unsatisfactory performance or behavior is related to the
drug use or alcoholism of such employee .... 378
379
Thus, employers may fire the employee who is in possession of drugs,
under the influence at work,3 80 excessively absent,381 or driving under the

for driving while intoxicated, he could not show up for work. He was terminated for
excessive unauthorized absence. Id.
375.
480 U.S. 273, 282 (1987). See supra discussion accompanying notes 353-54
regarding the Arline case.
376.
42 U.S.C. §12114(c) (2000).
377.
162 F.3d 604 (10th Cir. 1998)
378.
Id. at 608-09 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12114(c)(4) (2000)).
379.
See, e.g., Pernice v. City of Chi., 237 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2001).
380.
See, e.g., Bekker v. Humana Health Plan, Inc., 229 F.3d 662 (7th Cir. 2000)
(stating that a physician who was reported to have smelled of alcohol while at work and who
refused treatment when offered was discharged for presenting a safety and business risk as
well as being perceived as an alcoholic).
381.
See, e.g., Fogle v. Ispat Inland, Inc., 32 F.App'x 155, 157 (7th Cir. 2002)
(finding plaintiff fired for excessive absenteeism, not drug addiction); Brown v. Lucky
Stores, Inc., 246 F.3d 1182, 1187 (9th Cir. 2001) (explaining plaintiff was convicted of
driving under the influence of intoxicants and required to participate in a treatment program.
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influence.382 In addition, employers may fire employees for legal consequences suffered from drinking 383 and for various acts of misconduct
caused by drinking.38 4
Her employer fired her for her absence during the treatment program). The court said that
she could be held to the same performance standards as other employees. Id.
See, e.g., Despears v. Milwaukee County, 63 F.3d 635, 636-37 (7th Cir. 1995)
382.
(finding decision to drive is not due to alcoholism but bad conduct, for which the plaintiff
was terminated). The court said that the plaintiffs alcoholism was not the sole cause of his
drunk driving; he had to make a decision to drive while drunk. Id.
See, e.g., Brown v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 246 F.3d 1182, 1187-88 (9th Cir. 2001)
383.
(holding plaintiff could be held to the same performance standards as other employees);
Arbogast v. Alcoa Bldg. Products, 165 F.3d 31 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding plaintiff was not
discriminated against because of his alcoholism, but rather his bad behavior and that he
could not show that other similarly situated employees were treated differently); Ibarra v.
Sunset Scavenger Co., No. C 01-2875 SI, 2003 WL 21244096, at *9-10 (N.D. Cal. May 21,
2003) (finding that the ADA does not require accommodation and expressly authorizes
employers to hold alcoholic employees to the same standards as other employees);
LaBrucherie v. The Regents of the Univ. of Cal., No. C 95-1533 SC, 1995 U.S. Dist. Lexis
12763, at *15-16 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 30, 1995) (finding plaintiff fired for absence from work
due to incarceration for DUI).
384.
See, e.g., Martin v. Barnesville Exempted Vill. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Ed., 209 F.3d
931 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that whether the employer perceived him as an alcoholic or not,
it could refuse to hire him because of his prior bad conduct); Livingstone v. United States
Postal Serv., No. 97-6178, 1998 WL 791828, at *6 (6th Cir. Nov. 5, 1998) (finding plaintiff
was dismissed because of his intoxication, the fact that he arrived at work unable to perform
his duties, and that he threatened the safety of others, were sufficient to support his
discharge. Even if his misconduct was related to alcoholism, he could be discharged for the
misbehavior). But see Brennan v. N.Y. City Police Dep't., No. 97-7779, 1998 WL 51284 (2d
Cir. Feb. 10, 1998) (holding that plaintiff policeman was a recovering alcoholic who had
consumed alcohol and fallen asleep on a public transport and left his gun in a bag on the
subway and later discharged; however, was not discharged due to him disability but due to
carelessness).
The current consensus with regard to misconduct related to a disability is
expressed in Despears v. Milwaukee County, 63 F.3d 635 (7th Cir. 1995), in which the
plaintiff was discharged for driving under the influence, as follows:
To impose liability under the Americans with Disabilities Act or the Rehabilitation Act in such circumstances would indirectly but unmistakably
undermine the laws that regulate dangerous behavior. It would give alcoholics and other diseased or disabled persons a privilege to avoid
some of the normal sanctions for criminal activity. It would say to an alcoholic: We know it is more difficult for you to avoid committing the
crime of drunk driving than it is for healthy people, and therefore we
will lighten the sanction by letting you keep your job in circumstances
where anyone else who engaged in the same criminal behavior would
lose it.
The refusal to excuse, or even alleviate the punishment of, the disabled
person who commits a crime under the influence as it were of his disability yet not compelled by it and so not excused by it in the eyes of the
criminal law is not "discrimination" against the disabled; it is a refusal to
discriminate in their favor. It is true that the Americans with Disabilities
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These holdings have had further effect. Courts used to say that other
disabilities are not treated the same way as alcoholism, so that misconduct
caused by other disabilities should not be cause for discipline.385 Nevertheless, the treatment accorded alcoholism in this regard has spilled over into
other disabilities, and misconduct justifies discipline, even if caused by the
plaintiffs disability other than alcoholism. 386
Another difference between alcoholism and other disabilities is that
the employer may impose additional requirements on alcoholic employees
who have sought leave to go to treatment. Many employers require
employees to sign agreements that they will seek no further accommodation; that this is their last chance.38 7

Act and the Rehabilitation Act require the employer to make a reasonable accommodation of an employee's disability, but we do not think it is
a reasonably required accommodation to overlook infractions of law....
Id. at 637 (citation omitted).
The court said that the decision to drive is not due to alcoholism but bad
conduct, for which the plaintiff was terminated and that the plaintiffs alcoholism was not
the sole cause of his drunk driving; he had to make a decision to drive while drunk. Id.
385.
Id. at 636.
386.
See, e.g., Brohm v. JI- Props., 149 F.3d 517 (6th Cir. 1998) (analogizing the
plaintiff anesthesiologist's sleeping during surgical procedures caused by sleep apnea to
cases in which the plaintiff was fired for misconduct caused by his alcoholism); Teahan v.
Metro-N. Commuter R.R. Co., 951 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that a termination for
excessive absenteeism caused by the plaintiffs alcoholism was discrimination based solely
on disability because it was based on a factor closely related to the plaintiff's disability);
Maddox v. Univ. of Tenn., 62 F.3d 843 (6th Cir. 1995) (approving the firing of a football
coach for driving while intoxicated which the plaintiff alleged was causally connected to his
alcoholism and holding there is a distinction between discharging someone for misconduct
and discharging someone for his disability). Otherwise the employer would have to
accommodate behavior considered unacceptable in other employees because of the
plaintiffs disability. Id.
See also Kelly Cahill Timmons, Accommodating Misconduct under the
Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 57 FLA. L. REv. 187 (2005) (discussing misconduct and
disabilities other than alcoholism); Gasper v. Perry, No. 97-1542, 1998 WL 393708 (4th Cir.
July 2, 1998) (holding in a case where the plaintiff had difficulty relating to people because
of catastrophic injuries received in an accident that an employer may discharge an employee
for misconduct, even if the misconduct is related to the plaintiffs disability); Matthews v.
Commonwealth Edison Co., 128 F.3d 1194 (7th Cir. 1997) (explaining that an employer
may prefer a non-disabled employee over a disabled employee who does not perform as
well, even if his less able performance is due to his disability and holding that while plaintiff
had been out of work because of a heart attack and rated low on quantity of work performed
he was not fired because of his disability; he was fired as a consequence of his disability).
387.
See infra note 389.
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2)

Violation of last chance agreement

Nelson v. Williams Field Services Co. 388 is typical of the last chance
agreement cases. 389 The defendant encouraged employees who thought
they had an alcohol or drug problem to come forward and seek help. 39' The
plaintiff was concerned about his alcohol consumption, and he was given
time off for treatment if he would sign an agreement that he would refrain
from consuming alcohol and drugs for the duration of his employment and
submit to periodic testing. 391 Three years after his return to work, the
plaintiff was arrested on his own time while driving under the influence of
alcohol.392 The district court found that the plaintiff had been terminated
for violating the agreement not to consume alcohol or drugs for the duration
of his employment, not because he was an alcoholic.3 93
In fact, the plaintiff was discharged for violating an agreement that he
was forced to enter into in exchange for leave to get help for his impairment,394 which has generally been recognized as a reasonable accommoda388. Nos. 99-8041, 98-CV-242-D, 2000 WL 743684 (10th Cir. June 9, 2000).
389. Numerous courts in other circuits have similarly held that violation of return to
work agreements or Last Chance Agreements constitute legitimate, non-discriminatory
reasons for terminating employees. See, e.g., Mararri v. WCI Steel, Inc., 130 F.3d 1180,
1181-85 (6th Cir. 1997) (finding employer did not violate the ADA in discharging an
alcoholic employee who failed to comply with his Last Chance Agreement, which
conditioned his employment on counseling" and periodic testing for substance abuse);
Hinnershitz v. Ortep of Pa., Inc., No. Civ. A. 97-7148, 1998 WL 962096, at *6 (E.D.Pa.
Dec. 22, 1998), affd, 203 F.3d 817 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding defendant articulated a
legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the plaintiffs discharge where the plaintiff
breached his return to work agreement); Nanopoulos v. Lukens Steel Co., No. Civ. A. 966483, 1997 WL 438463, at *4 (E.D.Pa. July 29, 1997), affd, 156 F.3d 1225 (3d Cir. 1998)
(holding where the defendant has advanced valid, non-discriminatory reasons for firing the
plaintiff, namely, his violation of his Last Chance Agreement, no rational jury could find
discrimination); Golson-El v. Runyon, 812 F.Supp. 558, 561 (E.D.Pa.1993) (holding that the
plaintiff was fired because she breached her Last Chance Agreement, not because she was an
alcoholic); Brock v. Lucky Stores, No. C. 98-4758 SI, 2000 WL 288395, at *6 (N.D. Cal.
Mar.14, 2000), afftd, 23 Fed. App'x. 709, 2001 WL 1458014 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding the
plaintiffs failure to strictly comply with a return to work agreement was a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating the plaintiff); Lottinger v. Shell Oil Co., 143
F.Supp.2d 743, 767-68 (S.D. Tex. 2001) (finding no discrimination where the plaintiff had
received an opportunity to obtain treatment and subsequently violated a return to work
agreement); McKey v. Occidental Chem. Corp., 956 F.Supp. 1313, 1319 (S.D. Tex. 1997)
(holding the defendants' termination of the plaintiff for failing to honor the terms and
conditions of his return to work agreement was a legitimate reason for termination of his
employment).
390.
Nelson, 2000 WL 743684, at *2.
391.
Id.
392.
Id. at *2.
393.
Id. at *3.
394.
Id. at *2.
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tion.395 The agreement made him liable to discharge for activities that
occurred off the job for which other employees would not have been
discharged. Thus, he was treated differently because of his disability, a
classic example of discrimination.3 96 The plaintiff in Longen v. Waterous
397
Co.
made this argument when he was discharged for violating a last
chance agreement. The court rejected his argument that he had been
discriminated against because the last chance agreement was not imposed
on other employees. 398 He also argued that he had been discriminated
against by being subject to termination for any use of mood-altering
chemicals, even if not in the workplace, when the employer's rule only
proscribed use of drugs in the workplace. 39 9 The court said that the plaintiff
agreed to these further restrictions in the last chance agreement.4 °°
In another case, Nauseda v. Tootsie Roll Industries, Inc., 401 the plaintiff was required to take a breathalyzer test every day after he returned from
treatment for alcoholism. When the plaintiff registered positive on the test,
he was fired.40 2 In response to the contention that requiring him to take a
breathalyzer test was discriminatory, the court said that the Seventh Circuit
has indicated this is "a rather generous accommodation., 40 3 Rather than
firing him, the company allowed him to return to work if he would take the
test. The court indicated that it was reasonable for the company to want
some assurance that the plaintiff was not under the influence because it
would affect the safety of the workers who had to work with heavy
equipment.40 4 As the court said, "[a]lcoholism is very difficult to overcome
.... Generally, one does not undergo treatment for alcoholism and become
immediately cured, which is clear from [the plaintiffs] own long history of
treatment. 40 5 The difficulty in treating alcoholism is exactly why the
395.
See Office of the Senate Sergeant at Arms v. Office of Senate Fair Employment
Practices, 95 F.3d 1102, 1107 (Fed.Cir. 1996).
396.
See Friedland, supra note 208, at 173.
397.
347 F.3d 685 (8th Cir. 2003).
398.
Id. at 688-89.
399.
Id. at 689.
400.
Id. at 688-89.
401.
No. 02 C 2150, 2003 WL 1873519 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 15, 2003).
Id. at *2.
402.
403.
Id. at *4.
404.
Id.
405.
Id. at *4. See also Mararri v. WCI Steel, Inc., 130 F.3d 1180 (6th Cir. 1997)
(explaining the plaintiff was fired for violating the last chance agreement, not for his
alcoholism and that the last chance agreement was an accommodation offered to the plaintiff
in lieu of firing him previously); Miners v. Cargill Communications, Inc., 113 F.3d 820 (8th
Cir. 1997) (holding the company perceived plaintiff as an alcoholic, so she qualified as
disabled under the ADA. In addition, while the company claimed that offering her treatment
was a reasonable accommodation the court found there was insufficient proof that the
plaintiff was an alcoholic and in need of accommodation).
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plaintiff needs more than one chance to get into recovery. Requiring an
alcoholic to sign a last chance agreement when he has only had one chance
to get into recovery consigns many alcoholics to job-loss because relapse is
characteristic of the disease. A reasonable accommodation should include
some tolerance for relapse. Moreover, employees should not be discriminated against because they obtained a reasonable accommodation to go to
treatment and should not be subject to discharge for activities that would
not result in the discharge of other non-disabled employees. °6
c.

Whether the plaintiffis entitled to a reasonableaccommodation

The issue of reasonable accommodation is complicated by several
factors. If the alcoholic is considered disabled because he is regarded as
such or has a record of being disabled, he may not be entitled to a reasonable accommodation.40 7 Several courts have held that if the plaintiff is not
in fact disabled, but is being discriminated against because of his record of
a disability or because the employer regards him as disabled, the plaintiff
does not need an accommodation.4 °8 The clear language of the Act does
not distinguish among the three prongs of the disability definition in
requiring reasonable accommodation; thus, reasonable accommodation
should be required for all three prongs, not just in the case of the actual
disability prong. 4° 9 An alcoholic has an impairment but is generally unable
to prove that it is substantially limiting. 410 Thus, if he is perceived by his
employer as so substantially limited that he cannot do the job, he should be
entitled to a reasonable accommodation to fulfill the purposes of the ADA
and to enable him to be a productive worker.4a '
406. See supradiscussion accompanying notes 396-99.
407.
See Lawrence D. Rosenthal, Reasonable Accommodations for Individuals
Regarded As Having Disabilitiesunder the Americans with Disabilities Act? Why "No"
Should Not Be the Answer" 36 SETON HALL L. REv. 895, 896-898. See also Friedland supra
note 208, at 186. See, e.g., Workman v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 165 F.3d 460, 467 (6th Cir. 1999).
"The prevailing view in the federal appellate courts is that a 'regarded as' plaintiff is not
entitled to a reasonable accommodation under the ADA." FRIEDMAN & STRICKLER, supra
note 2, at 195 (supp. 2005).
408.
See sources cited supra note 407.
409.
See Rosenthal, supra note 407, at 899 (citing other reasons why reasonable
accommodation should apply to all three prongs of disability definition, including "the
remedial purposes behind the ADA, furtherance of some of the ADA's most important
goals, the idea that employers should not benefit by creating and following stereotypes the
ADA was meant to eliminate, the Supreme Court's decision in School Board of Nassau
County v. Arline, [citation omitted] and the legislative history behind the 'regarded as' prong
of the ADA.").
410.
See Section IV.B.2.a.1).
See generally Rosenthal, supra note 407, at 962-63 (noting that if the employee
411.
has no impairment, then he does not need a reasonable accommodation. If, however, he has
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If he is entitled to a reasonable accommodation, there are two factors
that must be considered with regard to alcoholics. One factor is that a
reasonable accommodation must be limited so that it does not enable an
alcoholic to continue drinking.4 12 However, an alcoholic should be
sufficiently accommodated to enable him to get into recovery and stay in
recovery by attending counseling and Alcoholics Anonymous meetings.4 13
He should also be given a second
chance if he relapses and not be summa4 14
rily discharged for one slip.
Before the Court's narrowing of the definition of disability, beginning
45
in 1999, the lower courts uniformly held that alcoholism was a disability; 1

however, even then, alcoholics were rarely successful in getting a reasonable accommodation beyond time off to go to treatment.416 The reason for
this was the provision of the ADA that allowed employers to impose the
same job requirements on alcoholics and drug addicts as required of other
employees, even if unsatisfactory performance is related to the drug use or
alcoholism of such employee.4 17
In addition, the plaintiff may be allowed only one treatment. In Evans
v. Federal Express Corp., for example, the court said, in applying a
Massachusetts statute, that the plaintiff had already been reasonably
accommodated by being given a leave to go to treatment for cocaine
addiction, so that her second request for leave for alcohol treatment was not
a reasonable accommodation.4 18 The plaintiff said that she would become
an impairment and needs a reasonable accommodation to perform the job, the ADA's plain
language and remedial purposes require that he should have it).
412.
LaBrucherie v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., No. 95-16882, 1997 WL 398689,
at *1 (9th Cir. July 14, 1997) (citing Fuller v. Frank, 916 F.3d 558, 561 (9th Cir. 1990)).
413.
But see Turner v. Fleming Companies, Inc., No. 98-5065, 1999 WL 68580, (6th
Cir. Jan. 21, 1999) (holding that the plaintiff had been offered a reasonable accommodation
and could not hold out for the accommodation he preferred. The employer may choose the
cheaper of two effective accommodations).
414.
See supra Section IV.B.2.b.2.
415.
See supra notes 256-57.
See, e.g., Office of the Senate Sergeant at Arms v. Office of Senate Fair
416.
Employment Practices, 95 F.3d 1102, 1105, 1107 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (stating that "it is wellestablished that alcoholism meets the definition of a disability." In questioning whether the
defendant was required to offer the plaintiff a "fresh start" the court concluded that offering
the plaintiff leave to go to treatment and light duty afterwards was a sufficient accommodation).
417.
See, e.g., Leary v. Dalton, 58 F.3d 748, 753 (1st Cir. 1995) ("Assuming
[employee's] incarceration was a 'manifestation' of his alcoholism, (citation omitted), we
reject the argument that [employee) should have been allowed to draw upon his accrued
annual leave as a 'reasonable accommodation' for his disability.").
418.
133 F.3d 137, 140 (1st Cir. 1998). See also Fuller v. Frank, 916 F.2d 558, 56162 (9th Cir. 1990) (stating that continued accommodation for an alcoholic would just enable
him to drink and that the plaintiffs at least three leaves for treatment before discharge was a
reasonable accommodation).
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qualified under the statute if allowed the second leave to seek help. The
court said that generally the employer cannot refuse the accommodation
and then fire the plaintiff because of inadequate performance.4 19 One
consideration in determining whether an accommodation is reasonable is
the likelihood of success.4 2 ° In this case, the court said that the company
could consider a second treatment not likely to succeed because the first
Also the court said that treatments for addiction are
one did not succeed. 421
"notoriously chancy.,
Even though the plaintiff was sober at the time of
the opinion, the company could rely on what it knew at the time or what it
could reasonably foresee.422 The court said that even if the company
sometimes gave multiple leaves, it was not required to and that the EEOC
does not require multiple leaves for treatment for addiction.423 The court
also said that even "ina more sympathetic setting-a treatment for cluster
migraines," the Ninth Circuit did not require multiple leaves.424
The refusal of courts to give alcoholics a second chance ignores the
fact that relapse is a symptom of the illness and frequently occurs. By
refusing to give the alcoholic a second chance, which is often what he needs
to get into recovery,42 5 the courts are balancing the two concerns: they do
not want to enable the alcoholic to continue drinking, but they want to
provide reasonable accommodation by allowing recovery. By giving
multiple chances an employer would be enabling the alcoholic,426 while
failing to give a second chance ignores the reality of the situation.42 7
However, most alcoholic employees are no longer entitled to any accommodation under the ADA, even to go to treatment, because effectively they
are no longer covered by the ADA.428

419.
See Evans v. FederalExpress, 133 F.3d at 140.
420.
Id.
421.
Id. (citing Whitlock v. Donovan, 598 F. Supp. 126, 134 (D.D.C. 1984)).
Id.
422.
423.
Id. at 140-41 (citing Schmidt v Safeway, Inc., 864 F.Supp. 991 (D. Or. 1994)).
424.
Id. at 141 (citing Kimbro v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 889 F.2d 869, 879 n.10 (9th
Cir. 1989)).
425.
See generallyALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS, supra note 1, at 140-45.
426.
See, e.g., Fuller v. Frank, 916 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1990) (stating that continued
accommodation for an alcoholic would just enable him to drink).
427.
However, alcoholics are not without some recourse. If the employer is covered
by the Family and Medical Leave Act, the alcoholic can get unpaid leave to go to treatment.
29 U.S.C. § 2612 (2000). See, e.g., Sloop v. ABTCO, Inc., No. 98-2440, 1999 WL 280281
(4th Cir. May 6, 1999) (FMLA requires a leave of absence for treatment of substance abuse,
but not if the leave is occasioned by the plaintiffs continuing to drink rather than go to
treatment.)
428.
See Section IV.B.2.a. 1)-3).
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ANALYSIS AND PROPOSED SOLUTION

Under the Supreme Court's recent decisions, is an alcoholic, active or
recovering, ever disabled? To be considered disabled, the impairment must
significantly limit him in a major life activity. 429 Because this is an
individualized inquiry, each active alcoholic must prove the major life
activities in which he is limited.430 Many active alcoholics have difficulty
sleeping, working, driving, performing manual tasks, or taking care 432
of
themselves. 431 They may have an assortment of physical illnesses.
However, as noted above, most active alcoholics are functional and able to
work,43 3 so they may not be able to prove that they are "sufficiently
limited" in any "major life activity," under the Court's restrictive interpretation of those terms.434 The irony of the Court's decisions is that only a
relatively non-functional, active alcoholic could possibly prove that he is
presently disabled and entitled to reasonable accommodation. If he does
get into recovery, he almost certainly loses the protection of the Act.
After the Sutton case, courts must measure a disability in its corrected
state. 435 Thus, the question then becomes: is a recovering alcoholic ever
disabled and entitled to reasonable accommodation? The impairment has to
be presently impairing a major life activity, so the unmitigated state of the
impairment is not relevant in determining whether the employee is
presently impaired.4 36 In its mitigated state, the only life activity that the
impairment significantly limits in every case is drinking alcohol.43 7
Because the courts have restrictively interpreted major life activity to be an
activity that is of central importance to most people's lives, 438 drinking
would likely not be a major life activity. The people to whom drinking is of
central importance are alcoholics, so it is unlikely that a recovering
alcoholic is significantly limited in a major life activity.

429.
42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000).
430.
See Section IV.B.2.a.1).
431.
See generally Starr supra note 61, at 2327-30 (discussing the costs associated
with alcoholism).
432.
Id.
433.
See supra text accompanying notes 52-53.
434.
See supra Section IV.B.2.a. 1.
435.
See supra discussion accompanying notes 128-33
436.
As discussed previously, he might be determined to have a record of a disability
or be regarded as disabled, but he probably would not be entitled to reasonable accommodation under either of these provisions. See supra Section IV.B.2.c.
437.
Because this is an individualized inquiry, some alcoholics could be limited in
major life activities because of physical consequences of the drinking, such as heart disease,
but this would be an impairment in and of itself.
438.
See supra text accompanying notes 184-89.
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If a recovering alcoholic relapses, he can be fired for one or both of
two reasons. First, if he engages in bad behavior connected to his relapse,
he can be fired because he can be held to the same standards as other
employees.4 39 Second, in exchange for the reasonable accommodation of
going to treatment, the alcoholic may have been forced to sign a last chance
agreement in which he agrees to more stringent oversight than other
employees. 440 Thus, whether he violates a work rule or not, he can be
discharged merely for relapsing.
Can the employer fire an employee simply because he is an alcoholic,
if he has an impairment that does not significantly limit a major life
activity? Under the first prong of the disability definition, the employee is
not presently disabled. 44 1 He cannot claim this protection of the Act, so the
answer is yes. This can hardly be what Congress intended.
Can such an alcoholic prove that he has a record of a disability? Even
here, the courts have not been generous. If he has been hospitalized for
only a short time for his illness, some courts hold that he does not have a
sufficient record of a disability. 44 2 In addition, he must prove that he has a
record of being substantially limited in a major life activity, which is also
unlikely, except in the case of very poorly functioning alcoholics. 44
If his employer fires him because the employer does not think an alcoholic can perform the job, can the employee show that he has been regarded
as disabled? Even if the employer believes that the alcoholic employee
cannot do the job because of his alcoholism, the employee will still have to
show that he is regarded as unable to perform in a range of jobs. 44 4 As
another author has suggested, there is not a statutory directive to view
"regarded as" from the employer's perspective alone. 445 "The important
role of stigma... suggests that an individual should also be protected under
the 'regarded as' prong when she experiences discrimination on the basis of
an (actual, past, or perceived) impairment
that is 'regarded' by society in
44 6
general as substantially limiting."
Even if the employee proves that he is regarded as disabled or has a
record of a disability, he may not be entitled to a reasonable accommodation. 447 So, if the employee needs an accommodation to attend AA and/or

439.
440.
441.
442.
443.
444.
445.
446.
447.

See supra Section IV.B.2 b. 1).
See supra Section IV.B.2.b.2).
See supra Section IV.B.2.a.1).
See supra text accompanying notes 352-54.
See supra Section IV.B.2.a. 1) & 3).
See supra text accompanying notes 13 8-43.
See Bagenstos, Subordination,supra note 28, at 447.
Bagenstos, Subordination,supra note 28, at 448 (emphasis in original).
See supra Section IV.B.2.c.
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therapy to stay sober, he is out of luck. Thus, he may be unable to maintain
his sobriety and will inevitably become worse.
Using alcoholism as an example, it can be seen that the Supreme
Court's decisions have effectively eliminated from the application of the
448
ADA at least one disability that Congress expressly intended to protect.
Obviously there are other conditions that the courts have decided are not
legally disabling, although thought before to be so in every case, such as
cancer.449
The Court's decisions limit the protected class to people who are traditionally disabled, such as people who are blind, deaf or unable to walk,
because they are totally limited in a major life activity.4 50 People with less
obvious impairments, such as alcoholism, diabetes, back injuries, and
mental illness generally may not be limited in a major life activity under the
Court's narrow interpretation of that term. Nevertheless, these impairments
cause these individuals to be substantially limited in life activities that may
not be recognized because the courts do not think that such activities are
central to a normal person's daily life. 45 '
The unintended result of the Court's decisions in the case of alcoholism is to provide protection only to some functional, but still very sick,
active alcoholics who should be encouraged to enter recovery. Once they
are in recovery, they lose protection of the ADA and become subject to
discipline or discharge, if they require the smallest accommodation to
remain sober.4 52 If they are unable to maintain their sobriety, they can be
discharged for not measuring up to the employment requirements or for
violating a last chance agreement.453 Surely this is not the result that
Congress intended or that society would consider desirable. In its zeal to
limit the coverage the ADA, the Supreme Court is limiting the employment
protection of the Act to people who cannot, or in the case of some active
alcoholics, should not, be working. 54
Why have the courts interpreted the ADA so strictly that plaintiffs
suing for employment discrimination under the ADA have to be so disabled
448.
See supra note 9 for legislative history.
449.
See cases cited supra note 312 (noting cases involving other impairments that
courts have determined are not disabilities); see also Eichhorn, Dancing,supra note 125, at
203-15 (discussing cases applying "substantially limited" to hold that persons who are blind
in one eye, missing fingers, and had an arm amputated are not disabled).
450.
See Kaiser, supra note 5, at 736.
451.
See Edmonds, supra note 189, at 340-48, 360-63 (discussing other life activities
that should be added to the list, such as driving, digesting food, eliminating waste products,
or exercising).
452.
See supra Section IV.B.2.a.1).
453.
See supra Section IV.B.2.b.1)-2).
454.
See Kaiser, supra note 5, at 736.
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that they probably cannot work anyway? 455 One can only speculate. One
obvious possibility is that the Court is generally hostile to employment
discrimination cases.456
With regard to the ADA, there are some additional considerations.
There are two problems with regard to the conception of the statute. One
problem involves the structure of the Act, and the other involves the origin
of this statute. With regard to the structure of the Act, the ADA uses the
same definition of disability - that a person must be substantially limited in
his ability to perform a major life activity - for all categories of coverage.457 Logically, protecting the rights of people who are seeking employment or trying to maintain employment involves different considerations
from protecting rights of people denied access to public accommodations.
It can be argued that people who are denied access to public accommodations are more likely to be more impaired than people who are able to work.
The Supreme Court has not been entirely consistent in this area and has
indicated that it is reluctant to designate "working" as a major life
activity, 458 even though the Court has said that "reproduction" is. 4 5 9 This
455.
The courts have been very restrictive in their interpretation of the ADA in other
areas relating to alcoholism as well. See, e.g., EEOC v. Exxon Corp., 203 F.3d 871 (5th Cir.
2000) (discussing the response to the Exxon Valdes accident in which an alcoholic employee
caused a serious accident and the company implemented a policy that removes employees
who have undergone treatment for substance abuse from certain safety-sensitive and littlesupervised positions as a business necessity).
456.
See Bagenstos, Supreme Court, supra note 3, at 944; see also, Jeb Rubenfeld,
The Anti-AntidiscriminationAgenda, 111 YALE L.J. 1141 (2002); Harold S. Lewis, The Civil
Rights Act of 1991 and the ContinuedDominance of the DisparateTreatment Conception of
Equality, 11 ST. LouIs U. PuB. L. REV. 1 (1992).
For a more optimistic view of the Supreme Court's attitude toward Title VII, see
Harold S. Lewis, Walking the Walk of Plain Text: The Supreme Court's Markedly More
Solicitous Treatment of Title VII Following the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 49 ST. Louis U. L.J.
1081 (2005), in which the author opines that the Supreme Court is interpreting Title VII
more broadly after the 1991 Civil Rights Act after years of unfavorable interpretations.
However, some authors have opined that the Court is treating the ADA even less favorably
than other anti-discrimination acts. See, e.g., Bagenstos, Supreme Court, supra note 3, at
944-45. Compare Colker, Windfall, supra note 5, at 100 (concluding that defendants are
winning more than 90% of the time in ADA employment discrimination cases) with
Waterstone, supra note 13, at 1826-32 (claiming that plaintiffs are doing substantially better
in non-employment cases and concluding that courts are more troubled by opening up
employment opportunities to disabled people than they are by opening public accommodations to disabled people). Plaintiffs have been more successful in the Supreme Court in nonemployment cases. See id. at 1838-42 ("[I]n nearly every Title II and III case before it, the
Supreme Court has expanded rather than narrowed the ADA.").
457.
Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 637 (1998). See Eichhorn, Major, supra note
196, at 1427-28.
458.
See Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471 (1999). The Supreme Court has
noted this reluctance, despite the fact the working was found to be a major life activity in
Arline and cited as such in the HEW regulations. Congress clearly intended Arline's (School
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somewhat schizoid treatment is reflected in the two cases discussed earlier
that were decided under the ADA's titles that govern areas other than
employment.46 ° In both of these cases, the Court was very generous in its
interpretation of the Act. 461 This may be some evidence of the Court's
hostility to employment discrimination cases.4 62 To be more gracious, the
problem may be that the ADA contains a conceptual problem, which
requires disability to be viewed more, rather than less, stringently for the
purposes of employment than disability for other purposes. The goal of
Title I was to enable disabled people to work,463 not to put them in the
dilemma of proving that they are sufficiently impaired to be disabled but
still able to perform the essential duties of the job; in other words, that they
are almost, but not quite, too sick to work. However, the Act as written and
interpreted allows that outcome.
The other problem is with regard to the origin of the ADA. The
ADA's predecessor, the Rehabilitation Act, applied only to the federal
government itself or to entities that consented to enter into a relationship
with the federal government, federal grantees and federal contractors, all of
whom were benefiting from the relationship. One can only speculate that
courts are limiting the ability of plaintiffs to proceed with a case out of fear
of allowing juries to hear these sympathetic cases or to require the employer
to prove undue hardship, which, according to the statute, could be
onerous.464 This reluctance may be due to the fact that, as opposed to the
Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987)) view of disability to govern the ADA.
See Rahdert supranote 124, at 321-29.
459.
Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 638 (1998).
460. See Bragdon 524 U.S. 624; PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661 (2001).
See supra Section III B. l.a. for a discussion of Bragdon and Section III.B.3 for a discussion
of Martin.
461. Id.
462. See Kaiser, supra note 5, at 753-54. Another reason for the treatment the Court
has accorded Title I of the ADA has been posited, and that is that the Court believes the
disability discrimination may be defended as rational, while other forms of discrimination
may not be. See Bagenstos, Supreme Court, supra note 3. Cf Anderson, supra note 27, at
119-20 ("Disabilitity discrimination laws in effect work as a subsidy paid by employers
through 'reasonable accommodation,' a subsidy likely to be borne disparately within the
labor market.").
463. See Olsky, supra note 34, at 1841 (stating that Congress was concerned about
the high unemployment rate among the disabled, which according to one survey was 39%).
464. See Samuel Issacharoff & Justin Nelson, Discrimination with a Difference;
Can Employment DiscriminationLaw Accommodate the Americans with Disabilities Act?,
79 N. C. L. REv. 307 (2001) in which the author explores the re-distributive nature of the
ADA. "The 'unfunded mandate' quality of the obligation was magnified by the undefined
scope of the ensuing responsibility to accommodate." Id. at 317-18. "[U]ntil Congress
confronts the disjunction of fitting a statute with such wealth-redistributive aspects into a
context of 'but for,' Title VII-like discrimination . . . [t]he Court's narrowing of the
definition of 'disabled' may prove the easiest and most effective way for the Court to limit
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Rehabilitation Act, the defendant is not getting anything in exchange for
making a reasonable accommodation that could be substantially burdensome. 465
In addition, as discussed above, some provisions of the Rehabilitation
Act required federal contractors and the federal government to take
affirmative action to employ the handicapped, as disabled people were then
labeled. 466 There was a concern that the employer would have to employ
people who could not perform the job, so the definition of one who is
currently handicapped was intended to be stricter than for one who is
discriminated against because he has a record of a disability or because he
is regarded as disabled.4 67 When the ADA was drafted, it simply used the
Rehabilitation Act definitions, even though affirmative action was not
required by any provision of the ADA.46 8 Nevertheless, the courts did not
interpret the Rehabilitation Act as strictly as the courts have been interpreting the ADA, despite Congress' express prohibition that the ADA should
not be interpreted less generously than the Rehabilitation Act.469 Judicial
activism is, and has been, cutting in more than one direction lately. 470 As
one author concluded, after an empirical study on ADA litigation:
The most sobering hypothesis that emerges from this data
is that the enactment of the ADA may have greatly harmed
plaintiffs' prospects under a related disability statute-the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973. On the eve of the effective
date of ADA Title I, Rehabilitation Act plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases were faring twice as successfully as would ADA plaintiffs over the next decade.4 7'
The solution is for the courts to recognize their obligation to follow the
express intent of Congress and interpret the ADA as generously as they did
the Rehabilitation Act. How can this be accomplished at this point in time
the seemingly unfathomable potential sweep of ADA claims." Id. at 358. See also Long,
supra note 71, at 622-23. Another author suggests a possible impetus for limiting the
protected class is the large number of disability claims filed. Stephen F. Befort, The Story of
Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.: Narrowing the Reach of the Americans with Disabilities
Act, in EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION STORIEs 329, 332-33 (Joel Friedman ed., 2006).
465.
See Colker, Windfall, supra note 5, at 161. See also Issacharoff & Nelson,
supra note 464 (discussing the re-distributive nature of the ADA).
466.
However, Section 504 does not require federal grantors to take affirmative
action, and the ADA was based on this provision of the Rehabilitation Act. See Burgdorf,
supra note 15, at 418-19, 476.
467.
See Friedland supra note 208, at 184-86; Burgdorfsupra note 15, at 432-33.
468.
See Burgdorf, supra note 15, at 418-19, 476.
469.
42 U.S.C. § 12201(a) (2000).
470.
See Rubenfeld, supra note 456.
471.
Colker, Winning, supra note 5, at 278.
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with the Supreme Court having boxed itself into a comer, recognizing so
few people in the protected class for employment purposes? Without a
legislative solution,472 which seems unlikely, the solution is to interpret the
"regarded as" and "having a record of' provisions as Congress intended.473
In both Acts, the employer assumes that the person cannot do the job
because either he has a record of a disability or because the employer
regards him as being disabled. If courts follow the intent of Congress, these
provisions should be interpreted more generously to prevent persons from
being discriminated against because of perceived disabilities.474 These are
people who can work, but who are being discriminated against because the
employer thinks they cannot perform the job.47 5 Under the Sutton case, the
Court adopted the EEOC's definition of "working" as a major life activity,
which requires that the plaintiff be unable to perform a range of jobs.47 6 In
the context of perceived disabilities, this definition works better than it
would under the actual disability prong because there is no conflict with the
employee being qualified to do the job, as there may be if the employee is
claiming to be actually disabled. If the employer believes that the
employee cannot do his job and deals with him accordingly, then the
employee should be considered substantially limited in the major life
activity of working.47 7 As the court in Shiplett v. National Railroad
472.
See Long, supra note 71, at 623-47 (reviewing the proposed legislative
solutions). See also Mark A. Rothstein, Serge A. Martinez & W. Paul McKinney, Using
EstablishedMedical Criteriato Define Disability: A Proposalto Amend the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 243, 282-96 (2002) (arguing for amending the ADA to
allow the EEOC to publish medical standards for determining who is disabled); Anderson,
supra note 27, at 129-49 (arguing for the removal of the phrase "substantially limits" from
the definition of disability); Eichhorn, Major, supra note 196, at 1473 (1999):
The current definition, which relies on notions of "substantial limits" on
"major life activities," has proved not only unworkable, but often harmful to the Act's purposes. It should be replaced with a definition based
simply upon mental or physical impairment. Under such a definition, if
a defendant bases a decision upon a plaintiff's actual mental or physical
impairment -or a plaintiff's record of such an impairment, or a perceived
impairment [footnote omitted] -and has no legitimate reason to do so,
then the defendant is liable for disability discrimination.
473.
See Bagenstos, Subordination,supra note 28, at 448 ("Congress included the
'regarded as' provision in the Rehabilitation Act (and now the ADA) precisely to protect
people disadvantaged because of 'society's accumulated myths and fears about disability
and disease.' ") (citing School Board v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987)).
474.
See Mayerson, supra note 48, at 592.
475.
Id.
476.
Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 493 (1999).
477.
See Bagenstos, Subordination, supra note 28, at 507-08 ("If 'working' is
properly treated as a major life activity because the inability to work is likely to be
stigmatizing and to lead to systematic disadvantage, then the test for substantial limitation
should reflect that function. An individual can experience stigma without being entirely
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PassengerCorp. said, if the employer believed that the employee could not
be a train engineer, then he would be perceived as unable to do a number of
safety sensitive jobs. 4 78 In other words, if the employer believes the
employee cannot do the job, then the employer would also believe that the
employee could not do other similar jobs. 4 7 9 That should be enough to
satisfy the Court's requirement that the employee be perceived as unable to
perform a range of jobs.480
The question then becomes: should people who are not actually disabled, but who are only regarded as or who have a record of a disability be
entitled to reasonable accommodation? 48 1 The answer should be a qualified
yes. While it may sound counterintuitive that a person who is not actually
disabled would need a reasonable accommodation, there is no such
limitation in the statute.482 Reasonable accommodation applies to all three
prongs of the disability definition.483 Once the person qualifies for the
protected class, the employer must reasonably accommodate any known
physical or mental limitations.4 84 With the courts' restrictive interpretation
of who is disabled, reasonable accommodation becomes especially
important. This is particularly true in the case of people who are only able
to work because they are using mitigating measures or require mitigating
measures that may necessitate a reasonable accommodation, such as an
alcoholic who may require some time off to attend treatment, AA and/or
counseling or a diabetic who needs breaks to check his glucose levels.485
unable to work. Even if one can find a variety of jobs (as nearly all people could if they
were willing to set their sights low enough), significant underemployment can itself be
disheartening, disadvantaging, and stigmatizing.").
478.
No. 97-2056, 1999 WL 435169, at *8 (6th Cir. June 17, 1999).
479.
See Burgdorf supra note 15, at 467 (stating that in Cook v. Rhode Island, 10
F.3d 17 (1st Cir. 1993), the court found that the jury could infer that the plaintiff was
perceived as being unable to perform a wide range of jobs if refused one job).
480.
This is supported by the EEOC regulations in this regard. The number and
types of job requirements are "not intended to be an onerous evidentiary showing." 29
C.F.R. § 1630 (2006).
481.
Courts have decided both ways. See Timothy J. McFarlin, Comment, If They
Ask for a Stool ... Recognizing Reasonable Accommodationfor Employees "RegardedAs"
Disabled,49 ST. Louis U. L.J. 927 (2005).
482.
See supranote 408-09 for additional discussion of this issue.
483.
42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2000). Cf. Friedland, supra note 208, at 186
(noting the "incongruity between the ADA's definition of disability and its accommodation
requirement").
484.
Friedland, supra note 208, at 186.
485.
See Margaret C. McGrath, Insulin-DependentDiabetes and Access to Treatment
in the Workplace: the Failureof the Americans With DisabilitiesAct to Provide Protection,
37 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 957 (2004), for problems posed by recent decisions for diabetics
who are not limited in a major life activity if they take their insulin, but who often need
reasonable accommodation to be able to work.

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 27

If reasonable accommodations were required for people who are only
perceived as disabled or who have a record of a disability, then the
accommodations would, in most cases, not have to be as burdensome as
accommodations for those who are actually disabled. This solution would
relieve the courts of their fear that the employer would be severely
burdened by reasonable accommodations.
VI.

CONCLUSION

There is another obvious consideration. Everything should not have to
be justified in terms of economic efficiency. The anti-discrimination acts
486
did take into account the morality of discrimination in forbidding it.
Foreclosing disabled people from employment, even if it is justified in
terms of economic efficiency, cannot be justified in terms of morality.
Furthermore, there is "a price -a cost- for securing more important
remedial and social objectives. 4 87
The courts have restricted the class of persons protected by the ADA
to an unconscionably small number. To rehabilitate the ADA, the courts
must protect those employees who can now be discriminated against with
impunity because employers incorrectly believe that their employees'
impairments prevent them from doing the job. Until a legislative solution is
feasible, the courts must accord the ADA its rightful place as a protector of
impaired people who are not in fact too sick to work, but who can now
legally be treated as if they were.

486.
Kaminshine, supranote 44, at 231-32.
487.
Id. For example, customer preference is not a defense in discrimination cases,
despite profitability. Id.at 232. "[D]iscrimination, at least in the short term, is not always
economically irrational. According to economists, an employer might find forbidden criteria
attractive, even if only crudely predictive of productivity needs, because they are relatively
convenient and cheap to administer." Id. at 239. BFOQ under both the ADEA and Title VII
require the employer to suffer some economic detriment rather than use a facially
discriminatory policy. Id.at 243-45. Similarly, the ADEA forbids mandatory retirement at
any age for most jobs. See Johnson, supra note 203, at n.305.

